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We develop a dynamic multi-region model, with ￿ uctuating regional house prices,
where an owner-occupied household￿ s location choice depends on its current wealth
and its current type and involves both consumption and investment considerations.
The relative strength of the consumption motive and the investment motive in the
location choice determines the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting, with a
strong investment (consumption) motive implying sorting according to the type
(wealth). The model predicts a negative relation between the size of house price
￿ uctuations and the degree of residential sorting in the type dimension. Also, movers
should be more sorted than stayers in the type dimension. These predictions are
consistent with evidence from US metropolitan areas when income, education and
age are used as proxies for household type.
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When a household buys a home in a certain location, the choice it makes has major
implications for the composition of its wealth portfolio. If the household buys a home in
an expensive area, it has less net wealth left to allocate to other assets. Also, regional
house prices ￿ uctuate over time, and as investments, di⁄erent houses and locations o⁄er
di⁄erent prospects. The success of today￿ s investment in a house will, in part, determine
what kind of home the household will be able to buy in the future.
This paper studies how the investment aspect of housing a⁄ects households￿location
choices, the socioeconomic make-up of local jurisdictions, and the pattern of residential
sorting. In particular, we address the following question: If investment considerations
and regional house price dynamics play a role in households￿location choices, does this
make local jurisdictions internally more or less homogenous, and externally more or less
distinct from each other?
The double nature of housing as a consumption good and as an investment is a central
theme in housing economics. Questions addressed in this literature include the role of
investment considerations in housing choices, and the interaction between housing invest-
ments and investments in other assets.1 However, the implications for the socioeconomic
make-up of local jurisdictions are not examined in this branch of research.
The aggregate spatial implications of households￿housing and location choices is a key
theme in the urban and regional economics literature that studies residential sorting.2 In
the sorting models households￿location choices typically involve a trade-o⁄ between, say,
a better quality of public goods and amenities in a desirable location, and lower housing
costs in a less desirable location. Then in equilibrium households with a high income
and / or a strong taste for the public goods and amenities tend to live in the desirable
areas. In many of these models also the quality of local public goods is endogenously
1See e.g. Ranney (1981), Henderson and Ioannides (1983, 1987), Poterba (1984), Brueckner (1997),
Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Cocco (2005), Sinai and Souleles (2005), Li and Yao (2007), and Bayer,
Ellickson and Ellickson (2010).
2See e.g. Ellickson (1971), Eberts and Gronberg (1981), Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984), Epple and
Romer (1989, 1991), Henderson (1991), Wheaton (1993), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple and Sieg (1999),
Kessler and Lulfesman (2005), and Bayer and McMillan (2011). For a survey see Ross and Yinger (1999).
1determined: people vote in local elections, as well as with their feet. However, since the
sorting literature typically uses static general equilibrium models, it largely abstracts from
the investment aspect of housing.
In this paper we develop a dynamic multi-region model, with ￿ uctuating regional house
prices, where both the consumption aspect and the investment aspect of housing a⁄ect
households￿location choices and the pattern of residential sorting. In the model, some
locations are more desirable and popular than others, in the sense that the majority of
households derives a higher utility from residing in a desirable location. In each period a
household chooses its housing location based on its current wealth and its current ￿match,￿
or current type (we use the terms match and type interchangeably). Empirically, the type
may be interpreted as re￿ ecting various socioeconomic characteristics (household size, the
age of household members, education etc.) that a⁄ect the household￿ s preferences and
location choices. Current wealth, on the other hand, determines whether the household
can a⁄ord a house in a desirable location.
Residential sorting takes place in two dimensions, wealth and the match. The pattern
of sorting that emerges in equilibrium depends on the relative strength of the consump-
tion motive and the investment motive of housing. If the consumption motive is strong,
the households mainly care about current bene￿t streams and seek to live in a desirable
location in each period. However, some of them cannot do so, because they are borrowing
constrained. Then the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting boils down to di⁄erences
in wealth, with wealthy households residing in desirable locations and less wealthy house-
holds living in less desirable locations. A household￿ s current wealth depends, in part,
on its past fortunes in the housing markets: the capital gains or losses the household
has made. Thus, when combined with a strong consumption motive in location choice,
the asset aspect of housing (i.e., housing market related wealth dynamics) gives rise to
residential sorting according to wealth, rather than household type.
However, there is also a second e⁄ect, that works in the opposite direction. When
choosing its housing location a household may think of the house as an investment and
as a stepping stone to a future home. In particular, buying an expensive home in a
currently popular location is a risky investment. In the future, when the household may
2want to resell its home, the location may no longer be so popular, and the previously
expensive house may have lost (a part of) its value. If these investment considerations
play an important role in households￿location choices, only households with a truly good
current match with (i.e., a strong preference for) a desirable location choose to buy a house
there. Thus a strong investment motive in location choice results in sorting according to
household type.
In sum, the more the households care about their expected future wealth and the
resale value of the home, the less the housing market related wealth dynamics and the
aggregate wealth distribution mould the pattern of residential sorting. Thus there is an
inverse relation between the importance of investment considerations at the household
level and the importance of the wealth aspect of housing at the aggregate level.
The main empirical prediction of our model links the degree of sorting according
to household type to the size of regional house price ￿ uctuations: these two should be
negatively correlated. Using income, age and education as proxies for household type,
we provide some empirical evidence from US metropolitan areas in support of this pre-
diction. In addition to the main empirical prediction, the model predicts that among
owner-occupied households, movers should be more sorted in the type dimension than
stayers. Finally, there should be a non-linear relation between wealth and mobility, so
that households with intermediate wealth levels are more mobile than the poor and the
wealthy. We present some evidence in support of these predictions as well.
Our paper is closest to the recent study by Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2008). In a
two-period framework, Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady examine tenure choice and income het-
erogeneity in booming cities, where house prices rise, and home-owners, who make capital
gains, may choose to stay put, even when newcomers typically earn higher incomes. In this
model setup the asset aspect of housing (the capital gains of home-owners) decreases the
degree of income sorting. The empirical results of the paper indicate that in locations that
have experienced strong growth in house prices, home-owners who have recently moved
in have higher incomes than their neighbors. Furthermore, in these locations, there is a
positive correlation between the dispersion of home-owners￿incomes and the dispersion
of the times since they bought their homes. Also the related work by Ortalo-MagnØ and
3Rady (2006) on house price dynamics and housing choices shares common themes and
features with our paper, although here households choose between di⁄erent apartment
types (￿￿ ats￿and ￿houses￿ ) rather than between di⁄erent locations. In particular, in
Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2006), as well as in our paper, capital gains and losses made
in the housing market are the key driver of household wealth dynamics, and borrowing
constraints may limit the set of feasible housing options.
There are also a number of other papers that analyze sorting in a dynamic framework.
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) study the joint process of falling house prices and neighbor-
hood change in declining cities. Due to the durability of housing, a negative shock leads
to a sharp fall in housing prices, but only a slow and gradual decline in city size. Low
housing costs in a city attract low-income households. In the model, however, households
are assumed to be renters, so that investment considerations and realized capital losses
do not a⁄ect residential location choices. Also in the earlier dynamic models of BØn-
abou (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), (who study sorting, the quality of local
schools and the accumulation of human capital) households are assumed to be renters,
and they choose their location once and for all (in the ￿rst period), so that the wealth
aspect of housing does not shape the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting.
Finally, the themes of the paper are related to recent empirical ￿ndings in the residen-
tial sorting literature. In particular, evidence from the US indicates that local jurisdictions
are internally more heterogeneous, and less distinct from each other, than many standard
theories of residential sorting predict: In a typical American neighborhood, neighbors
tend to di⁄er signi￿cantly in terms of income, age and education (Ioannides 2004). Fur-
thermore, heterogeneity across US municipalities and counties, measured with respect to
income and a number of other socioeconomic variables (including age, education, race, na-
tivity, religion, owner-occupancy rate and party vote shares in presidential elections) has
not increased over time, despite falling migration costs, which should have made sorting
easier (Rhode and Strumpf 2003). Finally, while the extent of sorting is generally quite
small, it also varies widely across metropolitan areas (Davido⁄ 2005). The predictions of
the present paper may help in explaining a part of these observations as well.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The basic model is developed in Section 2. Section 3
4shows how the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting re￿ ects the relative strength of the
consumption motive and the investment motive of housing. The section also establishes
a link between the size of house price ￿ uctuations and the pattern of residential sorting,
and analyzes the degree of sorting among movers and stayers. Section 4 develops some
extensions to the basic model. Empirical evidence is presented in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Some background and motivation
We develop a dynamic model of residential sorting, based on the following main ideas:
(i) For owner-occupied households, housing is both a consumption good and an asset,
and residential location choices involve not only consumption but also investment consid-
erations; essentially, expected resale value matters. (ii) Regional house prices ￿ uctuate,
and the capital gains and losses made in the housing market play an important role in
determining how a household￿ s wealth evolves over time. (iii) Borrowing constraints may
narrow the set of feasible housing options, and impair a household￿ s ability to move.
It is natural to include these elements in a framework which tries to understand
households￿location choices and residential sorting. In most developed countries, owner-
occupied housing is the single most important investment for a typical household. For
example, in the late 1990￿ s (i.e. before house prices ballooned in the housing boom of
the early and mid 2000￿ s), single family owner-occupied housing composed 2/3 of house-
hold wealth in the UK, 1/3 of household wealth in the US, and 2/3 of the assets of a
US household with median wealth.3 Given the importance of housing as an asset, it is
reasonable to assume that investment considerations may also play a role when people
choose where to buy a home. One simple way to motivate this assumption is to conduct
an internet search. Our Google search with key words ￿location￿ , ￿home￿and ￿resale
value￿produced over six million hits, with phrases such as ￿Buying a home with a resale
3Banks et al. (2002), Federal Reserve￿ s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
5value: location, location, location￿abounding.
Second, house prices are often highly volatile, and in di⁄erent regions property values
tend to rise and fall asynchronously, so that relative regional prices may vary considerably
over time. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this ￿nding with price data from UK regions and
US metropolitan areas.4 Relative prices can ￿ uctuate signi￿cantly even at a more local
level. In London, for example, the borough of Greenwich was 3% more expensive than
the borough of Hackney in 1995, but in 2001 prices were 20% higher in Hackney than
in Greenwich5; see also Iacoviello and Ortalo-MagnØ (2003). For similar ￿ndings on the
Boston metropolitan area, see Case and Mayer (1996).
The capital gains and losses made in the housing market can be remarkably large
in comparison with typical household incomes and savings, and empirical studies reveal
that falling home equity value may seriously constrain a household￿ s ability to move.6 To
illustrate the size of the wealth shocks, Table 1 shows maximum and minimum house-
price-to-income ratios in four major US cities over the period 1979-1996. In the UK, the
average annual capital gain in the London market between 1983 and 1988 corresponded
to 72% of the mean annual disposable household income in the UK over that period, and
exceeded by the factor of 7.8 average yearly household savings. Between 1989 and 1992,
the annual capital loss of a typical London homeowner was equivalent to 77% of average
disposable household income, and 8.4 times average household savings.
As a general rule, these housing market risks are uninsurable. Shiller (1993, 2003),
for example, lists home equity insurance as one of the key ￿nancial markets currently
missing.7￿ 8 Nevertheless, location choices and the timing of transactions can a⁄ect the
4According to Shiller (1993, Ch 5 p. 79) real estate booms and busts in US cities have been regionally
asynchronized and prize movements often dramatic. Del Negro and Otrok (2007) ￿nd that, with the
exception of the boom of the early 2000s, US house price dynamics have been mainly driven by local or
regional, rather than national, shocks. For further evidence on US prices, see also Case and Shiller (1989),
Malpezzi (1999), Capozza et al (2004) or Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005). For British evidence, see
Muellbauer and Murphy (1997), or Cook (2003).
5Source: Land Registry, http://www.landreg.gov.uk.
6See Chan (1996, 2001), Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2010, 2011), Henley (1998).
7Shiller (1993), and Shiller and Weiss (1999) discuss the potential problems, both economic and
psychological, involved in providing hedging against house price swings, as well as ways to overcome
these problems. See Shiller (1993, 2003), and Iacovello and Ortalo-MagnØ (2003) for discussion on some
real life experiments in the US and the UK.
8While CDSs on MBSs could in principle provide protection against deteriorating (local) housing
market conditions, these products have been designed for large-scale institutional investors and they
6distribution of risks that a household faces. While house price ￿ uctuations include an im-
portant random component, they also display certain regularities. In particular, regional
house prices tend to exhibit mean-reversion in time horizons of one year and longer;
possible explanations include lags in housing construction, mean-reversion in underlying
economic fundamentals, and the interaction of borrowing constraints and wealth e⁄ects,
which gives rise to temporary overshooting of prices.9 There is also some evidence on
long-run equilibrium relationships between house prices in di⁄erent areas: if prices in a
particular location are currently above the equilibrium level, they are likely to fall, in
relative terms, some time in the future; if relative prices are above the equilibrium level,
the opposite is likely to happen.10
2.2 The basics of the economy
The economy has two locations. Each location has an equal, ￿xed, stock of identical
houses. Each house is occupied by a single household and no one household is ever home-
less. All households are owner-occupiers and there is no rental housing. For convenience,
assume that the stock of houses and the mass of households each comprises a continuum
of size unity.
There are in￿nite discrete time periods indexed by t = 0;1;:::. In each period, one of
the locations is deemed to be ￿desirable￿while the other one is ￿less desirable￿ . When
a period changes, the relative ranking of the locations is reversed with probability ￿ 2
(0;1).11
have not been available to ordinary households. Also, arguably CDSs could not even in princple provide
protection to all households: for the owner of a CDS to receive a payment, some housholds have to be
unable to service their mortgage.
9See Glaeser and Gyourko (2007), Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2006), Evenson (2003), Lamont and Stein
(1999).
10That is, regional house prices are cointegrated. For evidence from British regions, see MacDonald
and Taylor (1993), Alexander and Barrow (1994) or Cook (2003). For evidence from US census regions,
as well as for a comparison between the US and the UK, see Meen (2002). More recent econometric
analyses are also consistent with regional house price cycles. For example, Holly, Pesaran and Yamagata
(2011) ￿nd that house price shocks to dominant UK regions, such as London, are propagated across other
dominant regions, but have impact on other regions with a delay. Furthermore, lagged e⁄ects are found
to echo back to the dominant regions. These ￿ndings are consistent with our assumption that house
prices ￿ uctuate asynchronously across regions. For related evidence on the US, see Holly, Pesaran and
Yamagata (2010).
11The regional shock may re￿ ect e.g. altering labor market conditions, changes in the supply of public
7We also consider a small region interpretation of the model, with a continuum of loca-
tions. Then in each period, one half of the locations are ￿desirable￿while the remaining
locations are ￿less desirable￿ , and when a period changes, a measure ￿ of the locations
is hit by a regional shock. The long-run equilibrium of the model is essentially identical
under both interpretations. Section 4 shows that the small region (interpretation of the)
model can be generalized to cover the asymmetric case where the shares of desirable and
undesirable locations are not equal (they di⁄er from 50/50).
The households di⁄er in the utility premium they derive from residing in the desirable
location. The household speci￿c component of the premium is captured by the match, ￿:
a high realization of ￿ implies a good match with the currently desirable location, while
a low (negative) realization implies a good match with the less desirable location.12 The
aggregate heterogeneity of households is unchanged over time, and ￿ has a stationary
distribution, with a cumulative distribution function G(￿), on some support [￿L;￿H].
Without loss of generality, we assume that the median match ￿m = 0, i.e. G(0) = 1
2.
A household with current match ￿ receives per period utility 1
2"+￿, when living in the
currently desirable location. The per period utility of anyone household living in the less
desirable location is ￿1
2". Here the parameter " > 0 measures regional welfare di⁄erences.
" also gauges the size of regional shocks: if a location is hit by a shock, the utility stream
it o⁄ers to the (median) household changes from 1
2" to ￿1
2", or vice versa.
Given these assumptions, all households with a current match ￿ > ￿" derive a positive
utility premium from residing in the desirable location. The measure of these households
is 1 ￿ G(￿") > 1
2: In particular, if ￿L > ￿" and G(￿") = 0, all households would rather
live in the popular area. Since the measure of houses in the desirable location is one half,
housing is in short supply in the popular region.
A household￿ s match may change over time. First, if the neighborhood or jurisdiction
goods and services, or the evolution in the tastes and the needs of the population. Alternatively, the
resulting house price dynamics may be interpreted as re￿ ecting (in a reduced form) the interaction
between housing demand and supply. According to this interpretation, an area is currently expensive,
because housing supply has not yet increased to absorb a positive demand shock.
12As will become clear below, even households with low realizations of ￿ may derive a positive premium
from the desirable location. However, even if this is the case, households with low ￿ lose less if they reside
in the undesirable location than households with higher realizations of ￿.
8where the household resides is hit by a regional shock, the match between the household
and the location is broken, and a new match is independently drawn from the distribu-
tion function G(￿).13 Second, even if the overall popularity of the jurisdiction remains
unaltered, between periods the match may change for some idiosyncratic, or household
speci￿c, reason14, with probability ￿ 2 [0;1], and the new match is independently drawn
from the distribution G(￿). As discussed in Section 4, the assumption of independent
draws can be dropped: the main results of the paper generalize to the case where the
match is allowed to follow a general Markov process.
Finally, the households live forever and discount future utilities by a common factor
￿ 2 (0;1).
In any period, the aggregate welfare is maximized, if all households with ￿ > ￿m = 0
are allocated to the (currently) desirable location, those with ￿ < 0 live in the less desirable
location, and the group (always of measure zero, if G is continuous) with ￿ = 0 is divided
between the locations so that capacity constraints on housing are not violated. In other
words, there is perfect sorting according to the match.
2.3 Wealth dynamics
In the market outcome, the location choice depends on not only the match, but also on
wealth. In this section, we study how a household￿ s wealth evolves over time.
A household cannot sell a home without buying another one, and vice versa.15 We
choose the minimum level of housing wealth as the origin and ￿x the value of a cheap home
to 0. We also normalize the house price in a popular location to 1. This normalization
means that house price swings are always of size unity. However, we shall below show
13An underlying premise is that a location which was popular (unpopular) in period t and another
location which is popular (unpopular) in period t + 1 are likely to be ￿desirable￿ (￿undesirable￿ ) in
di⁄erent ways; thus it is plausible to assume that the match that the household had with the period-t
desirable (undesirable) location does not carry over to the period-(t + 1) desirable (undesirable) area.
14The match changes for similar reasons as in the search models by Wheaton (1990, 1993) and Williams
(1995). Examples include change of household size or educational status and evolution in tastes when
members of the household age.
15This follows from our basic assumptions: (i) no household can be homeless (being homeless would
result in very large negative utility), (ii) there is no rental housing, and (iii) the measure of homes equals
the measure of households.
9how their magnitude can be measured in a meaningful way, by comparing them with the
value of ￿nancial assets, and with average household wealth.
Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that capital gains and losses made in
the housing market are uninsurable.16 The incomplete markets setting we consider here
is the simplest possible one. In addition to owning a home, the households can carry
wealth to the future by holding a single risk-free, non-interest bearing ￿nancial asset,
which can be interpreted as outside money. The real supply of money is M=p, where M is
the ￿xed nominal supply, and 1=p is the price of money, in terms of housing (in desirable
locations).17
Denote ￿nancial asset holdings by a and let h be housing. h is equal to 1, if the
household owns a house in a desirable location, and equal to 0, if the house is in an
undesirable location. We also de￿ne a household￿ s total wealth (n), which consists of
both ￿nancial wealth (money) and housing wealth
nt = at + ht: (1)
In any given period t, the household￿ s budget constraint is
ht + at = at￿1 + (1 ￿ st)ht￿1 + st(1 ￿ ht￿1); (2)
where st is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if there is a regional shock between
periods t ￿ 1 and t, and 0 otherwise. Combining (1) and (2) yields
nt+1 = nt + st+1 (1 ￿ 2ht): (3)
The household￿ s wealth position (n) changes if and only if the household makes a capital
gain or su⁄ers a capital loss in the housing market. This stark way to model wealth
dynamics is motivated by the observation that wealth shocks realized in the housing
market can be remarkably large compared with typical household incomes and savings.
16Clearly, also changes in the ￿match￿are uninsurable.
17We could also easily introduce pure credit, or inside money, and allow the households to borrow up
to a certain limit without changing any of the results. See the discussion at the end Section 2.5.
10If, prior to the regional shock, the household owned a property in a then unpopular
location, (ht = 0) the household makes a capital gain and climbs one rung in the wealth
ladder; if the house was in an expensive area (ht = 1) before the change of fortunes, the
household su⁄ers a loss and falls one rung down.
There is a lower limit for ￿nancial asset holdings amin, that a household is not allowed to
exceed. A simple and fairly natural normalization is adopted here by ￿xing the minimum
balance to be zero, amin = 0, but allowing a negative minimum balance would just involve
a change of origin, without altering the analysis or any of the results.18 Since the minimum
wealth level is n = 0 (the minimum level of housing wealth is 0, and the minimum level
of ￿nancial asset holdings is 0) and since households make capital gains and losses of size
unity, we can now assume, without loss of generality, that wealth only takes non-negative
integer values n = 0;1;2;:::. At wealth levels n ￿ 1, a household may freely choose its
housing location, and its wealth portfolio may consist of n units of ￿nancial assets and a
cheap house (h = 0), or n ￿ 1 units of ￿nancial wealth and an expensive home (h = 1).
If n = 0, the household owns a house in an undesirable location, h = 0, and since it has
no money, a = amin = 0, it cannot a⁄ord a house in a desirable location: choosing h = 1
would imply a = ￿1 < amin, and this is not allowed. The borrowing constraint that limits
a household￿ s location choices can be expressed as follows:
ht = 0 if nt = 0: (4)
2.4 The household￿ s problem




















18This is because the interest rate is zero. See Aiyagari (1994) or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch.
17.10). See also the discussion at the end of Section 2.5.
11subject to (3) and (4). The problem can be conveniently presented in a recursive form.
Let V (￿;n) be the (ex post) value function of a household with current type ￿ and
current wealth n. Also de￿ne the household￿ s ex ante value function V (n) = E￿ [V (￿;n)],
which describes the household￿ s expected prospects when the household faces a shock
(idiosyncratic or regional) and does not yet know its new match. The value function
V (￿;n) satis￿es the Bellman equation







￿ (1 ￿ h) 1
2" + ￿ f(1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)V (￿;n) + ￿V (n)]
+￿ [(1 ￿ h)V (n + 1) + hV (n ￿ 1)]g
(5)
subject to (4). In the current period, the household￿ s utility is ￿1
2" or 1
2" + ￿, depending
on its location choice. Its prospects for the next period are discounted by ￿ and are given
inside the curly brackets. With probability (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) the household is not exposed
to any shocks, and it will face the same value function V (￿;n) as today. With the
complementary probability [1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)] the match is broken and the household￿ s
prospects are captured by the ex ante value function. If the match changes for household
speci￿c reasons, the wealth of the household remains unaltered and future welfare is given
by V (n). If there is a regional shock, not only the match changes, but also house prices
rise or fall, and depending on housing location, the household makes a capital gain or
su⁄ers a capital loss, resulting in expected future welfare V (n + 1) or V (n ￿ 1).
At each unconstrained wealth level n ￿ 1, the household chooses the desirable location
if and only if
￿ + " > ￿￿ [V (n + 1) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)]: (6)
The condition (6) involves a useful decomposition of the decision problem into the con-
sumption motive, ￿guring on the left-hand side, and the investment motive, visible on
the right-hand side. The strength of the consumption motive depends on the current
match ￿ and the measure of regional disparities ". If there were no need to care about
the future, all households with ￿ > ￿" would choose the currently desirable region, while
only those with ￿ < ￿" would (voluntarily) live in the less popular area. The downside
of choosing a currently popular and expensive location is that a household may su⁄er
12capital losses, if regional house prices fall, and may then be borrowing constrained in the
future, when the match ￿ with an expensive location is better than today. By contrast,
opting for a currently less popular and less expensive area entails the chance of making
capital gains. These considerations are captured by the investment motive. Due to the
investment motive, even some households with ￿ > ￿", i.e. households whose immediate
bene￿ts are higher in the desirable location, may voluntarily choose the unpopular area.







￿H if n = 0
￿" + ￿￿ [V (n + 1) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)] if n ￿ 1
(7)
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￿
n




Figure 3 shows the critical match ￿
￿
n with di⁄erent values of n when ￿ is uniformly distrib-
uted on [￿1
2; 1
2], " = 1, ￿ = :95, and ￿ = :3. Clearly, ￿
￿
n decreases with n, and wealthier
households are ready to choose the desirable location even with a more modest match.
This is a general property of ￿
￿
n, and it stems from the fact that the ex ante value function
is concave. (Concavity is proved in the appendix.) Also, this ￿nding has a natural inter-
pretation. Assets are valued since they provide the option to make unconstrained choices
in the future. However, if a household is wealthy, additional assets are of less value: the
more assets the household has, the more distant is the prospect of being borrowing con-
strained at some point in the future. To put it di⁄erently, the investment motive is more
important for poor households than for wealthy households.
The appendix shows that at very high wealth levels, the investment motive all but
vanishes, and as a consequence limn!1￿
￿
n = ￿". That is, the majority of su¢ ciently
wealthy households live in expensive locations. This property is needed, when we establish
the equilibrium of the model. In particular, if ￿L > ￿" ￿and all households prefer the
desirable location from the consumption point of view ￿there is a ￿nite wealth level n,
13such that all households with n ￿ n choose a desirable location. In Figure 3, ￿L = ￿1
2 >
￿1 = ￿", and n = 3.
2.5 Equilibrium
The previous section showed how a household chooses its location, and its asset portfolio,
based on its current wealth and its current match. On the other hand, a household￿ s
current wealth depends on its past fortunes in the housing market, and its past location
and portfolio choices. Then the long-run wealth distribution is induced by the households￿
policy rule. Location choices, the stationary wealth distribution, and the relative price of
housing and ￿nancial assets (p) together constitute the long-run equilibrium of the model.




n (n) = G(￿
￿
n)f (n) (9)
is then the frequency of households at wealth level n, with a cheap home (h = 0) and n
units of ￿nancial assets. Similarly,
f
1
n￿1 (n) = (1 ￿ G(￿
￿
n))f (n) (10)
is the frequency of households at wealth level n, owning an expensive home (h = 1) and
n￿1 units of ￿nancial assets. If there is a regional shock, all f (n) households which were
previously in wealth class n either go up to n+1 or fall to n￿1, depending on their house
location. They are replaced by f0
n￿1 (n ￿ 1) class n ￿ 1 households which have made a
capital gain and f1
n (n + 1) class n+1 households which have su⁄ered a capital loss. The
wealth distribution is stationary if and only if




n￿1 (n ￿ 1) + f
1
n (n + 1)
￿
(11)
for all n; where s is an indicator variable which is 1 if there is a regional shock and 0
otherwise. We also consider the model version, with a continuum of atomistic regions.
Between any periods, a measure ￿ of the locations is hit by a regional shock, and the
14wealth distribution is stationary if and only if




n￿1 (n ￿ 1) + f
1
n (n + 1)
￿
: (12)
It is easy to conclude that (11) and (12) both reduce to
f (n) ￿ f
0
n (n) + f
1
n￿1 (n) = f
0
n￿1 (n ￿ 1) + f
1
n (n + 1): (13)
As a consequence, both model variants have the same long-run wealth distribution.
There are no wealth classes below 0 (i.e., f (n) = 0 for n < 0) and at wealth level 0 the
households can only choose an unpopular location (i.e., f1
￿1 (0) = 0). These restrictions
and (13) then imply the set of equations
f
1
n (n + 1) = f
0
n (n); n = 0;1;::: (14)
Equations (14) imply that the distribution of ￿nancial assets is identical in both locations -
or location types. This symmetry property means that in steady state the asset side of the
economy, as de￿ned by the joint distribution of housing wealth and ￿nancial wealth, looks
exactly the same at the end of any given period and at the beginning of the subsequent
period even if the popularity ranking of the locations is reversed.
Next, plugging (9) and (10) into (14) shows that the long-run wealth distribution is
implicitly characterized by the sequence













For the stationary distribution to exist, the sequence (15) has to converge. Convergence
is guaranteed since limn!1 ￿
￿
n = limn!1 ￿
￿
n￿1 = ￿" and
lim
n!1






15The inequality (17) holds since G(￿") < 1
2: the majority of wealthy households live in










where ￿ (0) ￿ 1 and ￿ (n); n = 1;2;::: are given by (16).
The wealth distribution is single-peaked, with wealth classes in the middle having
more mass than those on the tails, and the right tail can be approximated by a power
series.19 These properties are consistent with observed empirical wealth distributions. In
the hump of the wealth distribution ￿(n) ￿ 1,20 meaning that the critical match ￿
￿
n tends
to be relatively close to ￿m: interestingly, in the hump the households￿location choice rule
(summarized by ￿
￿
n) tends to be relatively close to the socially optimal rule, while in the
tails location choices deviate more from the socially optimal policy. (A similar property
applies in the model with asymmetric locations; see Section 4.1.)
The shape of the wealth distribution and the pattern of location choices in di⁄erent
parts of the distribution both follow from the fact that the distribution is induced by
households￿location choices. Poor households tend to choose a currently cheap location,
and they tend to make capital gains and move up in the distribution. On the other hand
wealthy households typically choose a currently expensive location, and they are more
prone to su⁄er capital losses. Thus wealth transitions tend to happen from the tails of
the distribution (where households make socially non-optimal location choices) towards
the middle (where location choices are closer to the socially optimal rule).
Households￿location choices together with the endogenously arising long-run wealth
distribution also guarantee that housing markets clear. Essentially, if few households will-
ingly choose the less desirable location, in the long-run equilibrium many households











20The mode of the distribution is a wealth level nmod such that ￿ (nmod ￿ 1) > 1 and ￿ (nmod) < 1:
16end up living there because they are borrowing constrained. More formally, using the
fact that f1















; h 2 f0;1g: (18)
These equations indicate that the demand for housing, on the left-hand side, is equal to





, in both locations, or location types.
In addition to the households￿location choice rule and the wealth distribution, the
third constituent of the equilibrium is the relative price of housing and ￿nancial assets,
p. To solve for p, consider the asset market clearing condition E [a] = M
p , where the
left-hand side is the aggregate demand for ￿nancial assets and the right-hand side is the
net supply, equal to real outside money.21 Using (1) and the housing market equilibrium
E [h] = 1
2, the asset market equilibrium condition can be rewritten as E [n] = 1
2 + M
p , and
the relative price of housing and ￿nancial assets is22
p =
M
E [n] ￿ 1
2
: (19)
Notice that p also measures the monetary size of house price ￿ uctuations.
We end this section with a few clarifying notes. First, there appear to be three markets
in the model - housing markets in the desirable location and in the undesirable location,
plus the market for ￿nancial assets - but there is only one relative price, p. However, since
the households have to live somewhere, in each period they actually face a single choice:
whether to own a home in a desirable location or in an undesirable location (given this
choice, ￿nancial asset holdings are then determined by the budget constraint (2)). Thus
one relative price is enough to clear the markets.
Second, while outside money is the only ￿nancial asset in the model, we could also
21The equilibrium we establish here essentially resembles the equilibrium of the simple Bewley-type
model considered by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch 17.10.4), where outside money and inside money





f(n) = limn!1 ￿ (n) =
G(￿")
1￿G(￿") < 1: Thus the sum E [n] ￿
P1
n=0 nf (n)
converges, and E [n] is always ￿nite.
17introduce pure credit, or inside money, and allow the households to borrow up to a certain
limit, without changing any of the results. In the steady state of our simple economy,
the interest rate is zero, so that inside and outside money are perfect substitutes (see
e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Ch. 17.10).23 Then if the borrowing limit, denoted
in monetary terms, is ￿B, the asset market equilibrium condition reads E [a] = M+B
p ,
and p = (M + B)=
￿
E [n] ￿ 1
2
￿
. This condition is essentially identical to (19) (and the
housing market equilibrium is exactly the same as in the basic model).
Finally notice the simple recursive structure of the equilibrium: Households￿location
choices and the endogenously arising wealth distribution together equilibrate the housing
markets and also determine the real demand for ￿nancial assets. The relative price of
￿nancial assets p then adjusts so that the real supply of ￿nancial assets equals the demand.
This simple recursive structure makes the equilibrium of the model easy to solve. This
simple structure also allows us to analytically characterize the pattern of residential sorting
under di⁄erent circumstances.
3 Residential sorting
3.1 Consumption motive, investment motive and residential sort-
ing
This section studies how the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting re￿ ects the relative
strength of the investment motive and the consumption motive of housing. Furthermore,
we show that the size of house price ￿ uctuations depends on these motives as well, and
￿nally establish a relation between house price ￿ uctuations and residential sorting.
We begin by analyzing how the relative strength of the investment motive and the
consumption motive depends on the characteristics of the households, and on the envi-
23Assume by contrast, that the interest rate is positive and only inside money is held in equilibrium.
Then in any (non-degenerate) equilibrium of a pure credit economy, with zero net supply of ￿nancial
assets (see e.g. Huggett (1993)) some households must have negative positions. But, since the households
have no income sources outside the housing market, a household with negative initial ￿nancial asset
holdings exceeds any ￿nite debt limit with a positive probability. Thus there cannot be a stationary
equilibrium with a positive rate of interest.
18ronment where they operate. We focus on three aspects: the weight households give to
their future welfare (￿), the size (") of regional shocks and the frequency (￿) of regional
shocks.
Remember from the households￿location choice rule (6) that the strength of the con-
sumption motive is given by the term ￿ + ", while the investment motive is captured by
the term ￿￿ [V (n + 1) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)]. Now we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The investment motive of housing becomes stronger, compared to the con-
sumption motive, when (i) the households become more patient (￿ increases), (ii) the re-
gional shocks become more frequent (￿ increases), or (iii) the size of the regional shocks
(") decreases. Then at any unconstrained wealth level n ￿ 1 a household is more likely to










Proof See the appendix.
If the households become more patient (￿ increases), they care more about their future
wealth and the expected resale value of their homes. Then the investment motive becomes
stronger, and at any unconstrained wealth level, a household is more willing to live in a
currently undesirable location, and it needs a better match in order to choose a currently
desirable location.
Likewise, an increase in the frequency of regional shocks, ￿, strengthens the investment
motive to choose a currently less popular and less expensive location in the current period.
The higher ￿, the more likely a household that buys an expensive house su⁄ers a capital
loss, while the more likely a household living in an unpopular area makes a capital gain.
An increase in the size of regional shocks, ", has two e⁄ects. While larger interregional
welfare di⁄erences strengthen the consumption motive to choose a desirable location in
the current period, they also reinforce the incentives to accumulate assets (investment
motive) since a household loses more if it faces the borrowing constraint in the future.
However, since future utility losses are discounted and occur by chance, the e⁄ect on the
consumption motive dominates. Hence, the larger the regional shocks are, the less likely
an unconstrained household chooses a currently undesirable area.
Since the stationary wealth distribution is induced by households￿location and wealth
19portfolio choices, it also depends on the relative strength of the consumption motive and
the investment motive. Together with Proposition 1, the following lemma is a key to
understanding various subsequent results.
Lemma 1 When the investment motive becomes stronger compared to the consumption
motive (see Proposition 1), the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of ￿rst-
order stochastic dominance. In particular, the size of the borrowing constrained group
decreases.
Proof De￿ne the cumulative distribution function F (n;";￿;￿) =
Pn
i=0 f (i). By Propo-
sition 1, the ￿
￿
n-schedule shifts up when " decreases, or when ￿ or ￿ increases. This




n), so that by (15) the ratio f (n)=f (n ￿ 1) = ￿(n) goes
up for all n = 1;2:::. It follows that dF (n;";￿;￿)=d" ￿ 0, dF (n;";￿;￿)=d￿ ￿ 0 and
dF (n;";￿;￿)=d￿ ￿ 0 for each n = 0;1;::::
Notice the interplay between households￿location choices and the wealth distribution
in clearing the housing market under di⁄erent circumstances. When the investment motive
becomes stronger, at any given wealth level n households are more willing to live in a less
desirable location (the ￿
￿
n-schedule shifts up, see Proposition 1). But then in the long-
run equilibrium more households reach the higher rungs of the wealth distribution (as
shown in Lemma 1), where they are more likely to choose a desirable location (since the
￿
￿
n-schedule is downward sloping).
Let us proceed to studying how the balance between the consumption motive and the
investment motive a⁄ects social welfare. Addressing this normative issue will then allow
us to characterize the pattern of sorting, since in the present model high social welfare is
associated with location choices based on household type, rather than wealth.
Consider any given period. Since the households choose their location according to

















Summing over all wealth classes, and using the housing market equilibrium (18), yields














E [￿ j h = 1]: (20)
That is, the average quality of the match in the desirable location, E [￿ j h = 1], is a
measure of social well-being. Notice that w does not depend directly on the parameters
￿, ￿ and "; there is only an indirect link, through households￿location choices (Proposition
1, Lemma 1).
The next two propositions describe how social welfare and sorting in the match di-
mension depend on the relative strength of the investment motive and the consumption
motive in location choice.
Proposition 2 When the investment motive becomes stronger compared to the consump-
tion motive (see Proposition 1), social welfare increases. That is dw
d￿ > 0, dw
d￿ > 0, dw
d" < 0.
Proof See the appendix.
Proposition 3 When the investment motive becomes stronger compared to the consump-
tion motive (see Proposition 1), the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension
increases in the following sense. (a) In each location h 2 f0;1g, the average match
E [￿ j h] becomes more distinct from the economywide average E [￿]. (b) The locations
become more distinct from each other and the between-locations variance of the match
increases. (c) The locations become internally more homogenous in the sense that the
within-location variance of the match decreases.
Proof When the investment motive becomes stronger, compared to the consumption mo-
tive, it follows from Proposition 2 and eq. (20) that E [￿ j h = 1] increases. (a) Then, since
1
2E [￿ j h = 1]+ 1
2E [￿ j h = 0] = E [￿], and E [￿] is a constant, it follows that E [￿ j h = 0]
decreases. Thus the di⁄erence jE [￿ j h] ￿ E [￿]j increases for h 2 f0;1g. (b) Item (a)
implies that the between-locations variance V ar(E [￿ j h]) = 1
2 (E [￿ j h = 0] ￿ E [￿])
2 +
1
2 (E [￿ j h = 1] ￿ E [￿])
2 increases. (c) The economywide variance of the match V ar(￿)
can be decomposed V ar(￿) = V ar(E [￿ j h]) + E [V ar(￿ j h)]. Since V ar(￿) is a con-
21stant, it follows from item (b) that the within-locations component E [V ar(￿ j h)] must
decrease.
To understand these results, recall that the basic allocation problem in the economy
arises since there is not enough housing capacity in desirable locations to accommodate
all households with a positive utility premium. There are two main ways in which this
problem can be solved: self-selection according to household type (and the size of the
utility premium), and borrowing constraints that prevent some households from living in
an expensive area.
When the investment motive is strong, and the households care a lot about their fu-
ture prospects, many households willingly choose a currently less desirable location. Then
housing markets are mainly cleared through self-selection, which results in a high degree
of sorting according to household type, and high social welfare. When the consumption
motive dominates, few households willingly choose a less desirable location, and in equi-
librium wealth determines who lives where. A household￿ s current wealth re￿ ects its past
fortunes in the housing market, rather than some inherent characteristics of the house-
hold. Thus in equilibrium there is little sorting according to household type, and the level
of social welfare is low.
Let us have a closer look at sorting in the wealth dimension. Above we noted that
the distribution of ￿nancial assets is identical in both location types; see eq. (14). Then
interregional wealth di⁄erences derive entirely from di⁄erent house values. This applies
to average wealth in di⁄erent locations as well as to the quantiles of regional wealth
distributions





q = 1; (22)
where nh
q is the qth wealth quantile in region h 2 f0;1g.24 To assess the magnitude of
24Equation (21) holds since E [a j h = 0] = E [a j h = 1]: Likewise eq. (22) holds since we know that
the quantiles of the regional distributions of ￿nancial assets ah
q; h 2 f0;1g are equal a1
q = a0
q (given that
the distributions are identical) and since nh
q = ah
q + h:
22these interregional wealth di⁄erences in a meaningful way, we compare them with typical
household wealth in the economy:
Proposition 4 When the investment motive becomes weaker compared to the consump-
tion motive (see Proposition 1), in equilibrium interregional wealth di⁄erences become
larger compared with typical household wealth, as measured by average wealth E [n], me-
dian wealth, or any other quantile nq of the economywide wealth distribution, where
nq = min n, s.t. q ￿ F (n).
Proof The result follows from equations (21) and (22) and Lemma 1.
Remarkably, there is an inverse relation between the importance of investment con-
siderations at the household level, and the importance of the wealth aspect of housing at
the aggregate level. The less the households see the home as an investment, the larger is
the role of wealth in residential sorting.
The following proposition is about polar cases.
Proposition 5 (a) When " ! 0 or ￿ ￿
￿￿
1￿￿(1￿￿) ! 1, there is perfect sorting in the
match dimension and no sorting in the wealth dimension. In any given period, a household
chooses a desirable location if and only if ￿ > ￿m. (b) If ￿L+" > ￿￿
E[￿]￿￿L
1￿￿ , there is perfect
sorting in the wealth dimension and no sorting in the match dimension. A household
resides in a less desirable location if and only if it is borrowing constrained.
Proof See the appendix.
The equilibrium pattern of residential sorting, with di⁄erent values of ", is illustrated
in Figure 4. A similar set of ￿gures could also be presented with di⁄erent values of ￿ and
￿.
Next we turn to house price ￿ uctuations. One way to gauge the magnitude of house
price ￿ uctuations is to use their monetary size p. According to equation (19), p =
M=(E [n] ￿ 1
2) essentially depends on average wealth in the economy (M is an exoge-
nously given constant). Then more generally we can measure the price ￿ uctuations (the
size of which is normalized to unity) by comparing them to average wealth, median wealth
or any other quantile of the economywide wealth distribution.
23Remark 1 Assume that the investment motive becomes stronger compared to the con-
sumption motive (see Proposition 1). Then in equilibrium (i) the monetary size of house
price ￿uctuations, p, decreases, and (ii) the price ￿uctuations become smaller compared
with household wealth, measured by average wealth, median wealth, or any other quantile of
the wealth distribution.
Proof The result follows from eq (19) and Lemma 1.
When the consumption motive dominates the investment motive, most households
are willing to allocate the bulk of their wealth in housing, rather than ￿nancial assets,
although buying a home in an expensive location is a risky investment. Given this demand
for di⁄erent assets, in equilibrium the relative price of housing, in terms of ￿nancial assets,
p is high. Furthermore, the price changes that follow a regional shock are large, and capital
gains and losses made in the housing market are likely to a⁄ect a household￿ s ability to
buy a home in an expensive location. After a capital loss, a household is often borrowing
constrained. When the investment motive dominates, and many households willingly
choose a currently less desirable location, we have the opposite situation. House price
￿ uctuations are small in monetary terms and compared to typical household wealth. Then
a housing market related wealth shock has only a relatively small impact on a household￿ s
(relative) wealth position, and a typical household is well equipped to withstand capital
losses.
Combining Remark 1 with Propositions 1, 3, 4 and 5 allows us to establish a connection
between the size of house price ￿ uctuations and the pattern of residential sorting.
Corollary 1 Large (small) house price ￿uctuations are associated with (i) a low (high)
degree of residential sorting according to household type and (ii) a high (low) degree of
sorting according to wealth.
For an illustration, see Figure 4. In Section 5 we present some empirical evidence on
house price ￿ uctuations and the degree of sorting according to household type.
243.2 Movers and stayers
The asset aspect of housing has also implications for household mobility, and for residential
sorting among movers and stayers.
We begin by demonstrating a simple humpshaped relation between wealth and mobil-
ity. Take any given wealth class n. At the beginning of any period, the portion 1￿G(￿
￿
n)
of households own a house in the desirable location; since equations (14) hold in the steady
state, this is true even after a regional shock. Between any two periods, (1 ￿ s)￿+s house-
holds are hit by a shock, which breaks their match. Then the share ((1 ￿ s)￿ + s)G(￿
￿
n) of
the households, which are in the popular area at the beginning of the period, get a realiza-
tion ￿ < ￿
￿
n and move to the unpopular area. Therefore, mobility from the desirable to the





it is easy to conclude that mobility from the undesirable to the desirable location equals the







Clearly, there is more mobility in those periods when the economy is hit by a regional shock
and s = 1. Under the atomistic locations interpretation, in any given period, mobility
at wealth level n is b ￿(n) = ((1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿)￿(n). Notice also that in the two-region case,
b ￿(n) is the long-run average mobility at wealth level n.
Essentially, e ￿(n;s) or b ￿(n), de￿nes a humpshaped relation between wealth and mo-
bility:
Proposition 6 Assume that there is at least one wealth class n with positive mobility (i.e.
￿
￿
n 2 (￿L;￿H)). Then mobility is increasing in wealth at low wealth levels, and decreasing
in wealth at high wealth levels, so that households at intermediate wealth levels are more
mobile than the poor and the wealthy.
Proof Equation (23) implies that ￿(G) is a downward opening parabola, with its peak
at G(￿m) = 1
2. Also ￿(G) = 0 at the extreme points G = 0 and G = 1. Now the result
follows from three observations. (i) G(￿
￿
0) = 1; (ii) the critical match ￿
￿
n is decreasing in
25n; and thus also G(￿
￿
n) is decreasing in n; (iii) limn!1 G(￿n) = G(￿") < 1
2.
This pattern of mobility essentially re￿ ects the varying strength of the investment mo-
tive at di⁄erent wealth levels. Rich households, with a weak investment motive, typically
want to live in a popular location, and only rarely ￿nd it optimal to move. Poor house-
holds tend to reside in a cheap location; for the borrowing constrained this is obviously
the only alternative. At intermediate levels of wealth, the investment motive is neither
extremely strong nor very weak; when the match is broken, these households often ￿nd
it optimal to change location. Maximum mobility is attained, if the location choice rule
￿
￿
n corresponds to the socially optimal median rule ￿m. As discussed in Section 2.5, in the
mode of the wealth distribution, households location choices tend to deviate relatively
little from the socially optimal policy. Then, typically, the most mobile households are
found in the hump of the wealth distribution, while the least mobile are in the tails.
Remarkably, the relationship between wealth and mobility established in Proposition
6 is essentially the same as empirically documented by Henley (1998) for the UK; see
especially Figure 2 in Henley (1998). According to Henley (1998, p.425), ￿ levels of housing
wealth are an important factor in explaining mobility, and the relationship between the
two is not linear.￿ British households with large negative housing equity are virtually
immobile. Also very wealthy households tend to move relatively little. Households with
intermediate levels of wealth are the most mobile.
Next we proceed to comparing the degree of residential sorting among movers and
stayers. In any given period, we classify as a mover a household which has moved during
that period. The following results are proved in the appendix.
Proposition 7 (a) In both locations, movers have a better match with their (new) home
region than stayers, in the sense of ￿rst order stochastic dominance. In an expensive
location, stayers (old residents) are wealthier than movers (newcomers) in the sense of
￿rst order stochastic dominance, while in a cheap location the opposite is true. (b) Movers
are more sorted than stayers in the type dimension. Stayers are more sorted than movers
in the wealth dimension. (c) The di⁄erence between the sorting patterns of movers and
stayers (both in the type dimension and in the wealth dimension) is more pronounced in
26periods when house prices change, due to a regional shock (s = 1), than in periods when
house prices do not change (s = 0).
When interpreting item (a) of the proposition, remember that a good match with a
cheap location means that a household has a low realization of ￿.
Item (a) re￿ ects the fact that those who move from one location to another tend to have
rather strong match-related reasons to make that choice, while those who stay put may do
so largely because they have been lucky or unlucky in the housing market. For example,
households which move from a desirable location to an undesirable location, choose a
cheap area, although they could a⁄ord a more expensive house (their former home). By
contrast, at least a part of the old residents live in a cheap location because they have been
locked in by falling home equity values. Likewise, in an expensive region, newcomers from
cheaper locations tend to have a good match with the area they have chosen, whereas old
residents, who may have bought their home before the rise of local house prices, often
stay put even with a more modest match. Item (b) is a rather straightforward corollary
of item (a). Since movers are better matched with their home region than stayers in both
location types, movers are obviously more sorted than stayers in the type dimension.
On the other hand, interregional wealth di⁄erences are larger among stayers than among
movers, and stayers are more sorted in the wealth dimension. Finally, item (c) indicates
that the housing-market based mechanism, that gives rise to di⁄erent sorting patterns
among movers and stayers, has a stronger e⁄ect in periods when regional house prices
change. The empirical work on movers and stayers reported in Section 5 is based on
items (b) and (c).
4 Extensions
In this section we consider three extensions to the basic model. In subsection 4.1 we
show how the model can be generalized to cover the asymmetric case where the shares of
desirable and undesirable locations are not equal (they di⁄er from 50/50). In subsection
4.2 we consider the possibility that the degree of sorting according to household type
enters the households￿utility function; for example, the households may dislike the idea
27of living in a completely segregated area. Finally, in subsection 4.3 we relax the assump-
tion of independent draws from the type distribution, and allow the household type to
follow a general Markov process. In subsections 4.1 and 4.3, we adopt the small region
interpretation of the model.
This section serves two purposes. First, we show that the main results derived from the
basic model continue to hold in somewhat di⁄erent, and more general, settings. Second,
especially the extension with more general match dynamics (subsection 4.3) also provides
some new insights.
4.1 Asymmetric locations
In this subsection we consider a model speci￿cation where in each period the share of
desirable areas is ￿ 2 (0;1), while the remaining locations are undesirable. In the main
text we explain how the basic model is adjusted to allow for unequal shares of di⁄erent
locations, and show how the equilibrium is established. The appendix then shows that
the main results of the paper (Propositions 1-4, and Corollary 1) apply also in this model
version.
To study the extension with asymmetric locations, we need to alter some of the as-
sumptions of the basic model. First, we now assume that between any periods, a measure
￿￿ of currently undesirable locations is hit by a regional shock, while the measure of
desirable location that are hit by a regional shock is (1 ￿ ￿)￿. This process of regional
shocks is consistent with the stationary shares ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ of desirable and undesirable
locations.
Second, while the probability of regional shocks is di⁄erent in di⁄erent locations, we
think that it is still reasonable to assume that the probability that household type changes
is independent of location choice. Thus we assume that the probability that a new type is
drawn (due to a regional shock or for household speci￿c reasons) is the same, no matter
where the household lives. We denote this probability by ￿. This then means that in a
desirable location the match changes with probability (1 ￿ ￿)￿ due to a regional shock,
and with probability ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ due to a household speci￿c shock. In an undesirable
28location, the corresponding probabilities are ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ ￿￿, respectively.
We also slightly alter the payo⁄structure. A household with current match ￿ receives
per period utility (1 ￿ ￿)" + ￿, when living in a currently desirable location while the
per period utility of anyone household living in a less desirable location is ￿￿". These
modi￿cations are made to guarantee that, just like in the basic model, the measure of
social welfare w re￿ ects the degree of sorting in the match dimension. Indeed, with these
payo⁄s
w = ￿f(1 ￿ ￿)" + E [￿ j h = 1]g + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿") = ￿E [￿ j h = 1] (24)
depends on the average quality of the match in the desirable locations.25
What is important for households￿location choices is the di⁄erence between the payo⁄s
available in a desirable and in an undesirable location. Just like in the basic model, this
di⁄erence is ￿ + ". Thus, all households with ￿ > ￿" derive a positive utility premium
from living in a desirable location; again this is exactly as in the basic model.
We assume that the distribution of ￿ is such that G(0) = 1￿￿: This assumption implies
that housing is scarce in the desirable locations: the measure of households deriving a
positive utility premium from living in a desirable location is 1 ￿ G(￿") > ￿, while
the measure of houses in these locations is ￿. Finally, in any period, aggregate welfare is
maximized, if all households with ￿ > ￿1￿￿ = 0 (where ￿1￿￿ is de￿ned by G(￿1￿￿) = 1￿￿)
are allocated to the (currently) desirable locations, while those with ￿ < 0 live in the less
desirable locations.
With these assumptions, the household￿ s problem boils down to the Bellman equation
V (￿;n) = max
h2f0;1g
h((1 ￿ ￿)" + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ h)￿" + ￿ f(1 ￿ ￿)V (￿;n) + ￿V (n)
+￿ [(1 ￿ h)￿(V (n + 1) ￿ V (n)) + h(1 ￿ ￿)(V (n ￿ 1) ￿ V (n))]g
(25)
subject to (4). At any unconstrained wealth level n ￿ 1; the household chooses a currently
25By contrast, the payo⁄ structure of the basic model would yield w = ￿
￿1













": In this setting w would not be directly applicable as a mea-
sure of matchwise sorting (since here w depends on the parameter " as well as on the average match
E [￿ j h = 1]).
29desirable location if and only if
￿ + " > ￿￿ f￿[V (n + 1) ￿ V (n)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[V (n) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)]g: (26)
In addition to the households￿location - and asset portfolio - choice rule, the second
component of the long-run equilibrium is the long-run wealth distribution. The wealth
distribution is stationary if and only if
f (n) ￿ f
0
n (n) + f
1
n￿1 (n) = (1 ￿ ￿￿)f
0







n￿1 (n ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)f
1
n (n + 1)
￿
:
It is easy to conclude that (27) reduces to
￿f
0
n (n) + (1 ￿ ￿)f
1
n￿1 (n) = ￿f
0
n￿1 (n ￿ 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)f
1
n (n + 1): (28)
There are no wealth classes below 0 (i.e., f (n) = 0 for n < 0) and at wealth level 0 the
households can only choose an unpopular location (i.e., f1
￿1 (0) = 0). These restrictions








; n = 1;2;::: (29)
Using the equations (29) (and the fact that the aggregate mass of households is unity)










n￿1 (n) = ￿:
These equations imply that housing demand, on the left-hand side, is equal to housing
supply, on the right hand side, in both location types. Finally, plugging (9) and (10) into
(29) yields the sequence
f (n)




￿(n); n = 1;2;::: (30)
30(where ￿(n) is given by (16)) that determines the stationary wealth distribution. Since
G(￿") < 1 ￿ ￿ and 1 ￿ G(￿") > ￿ (this follows from the assumption that housing is











and the sequence converges. This then guarantees the existence of a stationary wealth
distribution. It is also worth noting that in the hump of the wealth distribution ￿(n) ￿
1￿￿
￿ ,26 meaning that in the hump, the households￿location choice rule (summarized by
￿
￿
n) tends to be relatively close to the socially optimal rule (summarized by ￿1￿￿); a similar
result holds in the basic model.
Finally, the asset market equilibrium condition is E [a] = M
p . Using (1) and the housing
market equilibrium E [h] = ￿, the asset market equilibrium condition can be rewritten as
E [n] = ￿ + M
p . Then the relative price of housing and ￿nancial assets is
p =
M
E [n] ￿ ￿
: (31)
This concludes our treatment of asymmetric locations. The appendix then shows that
the main results of the paper (Propositions 1-4, and Corollary 1) hold also in this model
version.27
4.2 Sorting in the utility function
In the basic model perfect sorting according to household type is the socially optimal
oucome. In this subsection we consider the possibility that the households may appreciate
some diversity, and dislike the idea of living in a completely segregated area. Then
perfect sorting in the type dimension may no longer be socially optimal. Nevertheless,
the descriptive results of the paper (linking the investment aspect of housing, the size
26The mode of the distribution is a wealth level nmod such that
￿
1￿￿ ￿ ￿ (nmod ￿ 1) > 1 and
￿
1￿￿ ￿
￿ (nmod) < 1:
27Also Propositions 5, 6, and 7a and 7b continue to hold. The proofs are very similar to those in the
basic model. Proposition 7c applies to the two-locations version of the model, and it cannot be generalized
to the case with asymmetric locations, where we assume that there is a continuum of atomistic locations.
31house price ￿ uctuations, and the pattern of sorting) still hold in this setting.





" + u(sorting in the type dimension)




" + u(sorting in the type dimension):
The new term u(:) captures the fact that while households may like having enough house-
holds like themselves around, they may dislike residing in a highly segregated area - a
ghetto. Thus a high degree of sorting in the type dimension may lower the households￿
welfare.
Three observations are in order. First, the new term u(:) depends on the aggregate
state of the economy, which is outside the control of an individual household. Second, the
term u(:) a⁄ects the level of utility in either location. Third, it is also easy to conclude
that there is a level shift in the value function, so that the new (ex post) value function is
V ￿ (￿;n) = V (￿;n) + u(:), (where V (￿;n) is the value function of the basic model), and
the ex ante value function V ￿ (n) ￿ E￿ [V ￿ (￿;n)] = V (n) + u(:).
Importantly, households￿location choices depend on the di⁄erences between the prospects
available in the locations. The di⁄erence between immediate bene￿t streams (the con-











= ￿ + "
is exactly the same as in the basic model. Also the investment motive (see the right-hand
side of eq. (6))
￿￿ [V
￿ (n + 1) ￿ V
￿ (n ￿ 1)] = ￿￿ [V (n + 1) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)]
32is the same as in the basic model. Thus the new element we have introduced into the
model does not change households￿location choices. Finally, since households￿location
choices give rise to the equilibrium pattern of residential sorting, all the descriptive results
of the paper (Propositions 1 and 3-7, and Corollary 1) remain intact.
The only aspect of the analysis, that has to be modi￿ed, is the interpretation of the
result established in Proposition 2. The measure w = 1
2E [￿ j h = 1] (see eq (20)) still
re￿ ects the degree of residential sorting in the type dimension. However, w no longer
gauges social welfare, which is now measured by
w
￿ = w + u(sorting in the type dimension):
Proposition 2 now reads:
Proposition 2* When the investment motive becomes stronger, compared to the con-
sumption motive (see Proposition 1), the measure of residential sorting in the type dimen-
sion, w, increases. That is dw
d￿ > 0, dw
d￿ > 0 and dw
d" < 0.
(The proof of the proposition is exactly the same as in the basic model.)
A stronger investment motive in location choice still translates into more residential
sorting in the type dimension. However, this does not necessarily mean that social welfare
increases.
4.3 More general match dynamics
In this subsection, we drop the assumption that, after a shock, the new match is indepen-
dently drawn, and allow the match to follow a general Markov process. This extension
introduces two new features to the model. First, the strength of the investment mo-
tive may re￿ ect expected tenure length and household speci￿c moving plans. Second, in
equilibrium there is endogenous correlation between wealth and the match.
There are J ￿ 2 di⁄erent match realizations. If the match changes for idiosyncratic, or
household speci￿c, reasons (s = 0), the transition probabilities from one match to another
are given by a transition matrix ￿0. If there is a regional shock (s = 1), the transitions are
33governed by a (possibly) di⁄erent matrix ￿1. To guarantee the existence of a stationary
joint distribution for wealth and the match, we adopt the small region interpretation of
the model, and assume that there is a continuum of atomistic locations. In each period, a
measure ￿ of the matches is broken due to regional shocks, and a measure ￿ for household
speci￿c reasons. Let ￿ = ￿￿ and ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿, where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the overall probability
that the match is broken, and ￿ 2 (0;1] measures the relative frequency of regional and
idiosyncratic shocks. The parameter ￿ can be interpreted as re￿ ecting the overall degree
of turbulence in the economy. The stationary marginal distribution of the match is de￿ned
as the eigenvector associated with a unit eigenvalue of ￿0, where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿0 + ￿￿1.28
Notice that if the frequency of shocks (￿) changes, but the relative probabilities of regional
and idiosyncratic shocks (￿ and 1￿￿) remain constant, the stationary match distribution
is unaltered.
Next we proceed to studying households￿location choices. The value function V (￿;n)
satis￿es the Bellman equation
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subject to (4). At any unconstrained wealth level n ￿ 1; the household chooses a currently
desirable location if and only if








e ￿;n ￿ 1
￿
j ￿;s = 1
i
: (33)
Importantly, the investment motive, ￿guring on the right-hand side of (33) now depends
on not only the household￿ s wealth position, but also on the current match ￿ (and on
the distribution of future matches e ￿, conditional on the current match). Intuitively, the
connection between the match and the investment motive may be interpreted as re￿ ecting
the household￿ s expected tenure length, and future moving plans. The investment motive
28We assume that the matrix ￿ is indecomposable, so that it induces a unique long-run match distri-
bution, but otherwise we do not impose any restrictions on the structure of the stochastic matrices ￿0
and ￿1:
34tends to be weak, if the household is attached to the home area, and wants to live there
even when the area is unpopular: it does not matter, if local house prices fall, since the
household has no intentions to sell.29 Attachment to home can be modelled by letting
the match be correlated with regional shocks: the household is likely to draw a high
realization of ￿, when the home area is ￿desirable,￿and a low realization of ￿, when the
home area is ￿undesirable.￿Conversely, the investment motive tends to be strong, if the
household buys a home knowing that it will probably not live there for a long time. Then
a major function of the current house is to serve as a springboard to the future home. In
particular, if the household is planning to move to a popular and expensive area in the
future30, it has an incentive to avoid housing market risks, which might jeopardize these
plans. In sum, condition (33) indicates that a household is likely to buy a home in an
expensive location (i) if it has a good match with that location, (ii) if it is wealthy and
(iii) if it is planning to stay in the location for a long time.
In addition to households￿location choices, the second component of the long-run
equilibrium is the endogenous stationary joint distribution of wealth and the match. The
vector di⁄erence equation, which implicitly de￿nes the long-run joint distribution is pre-
sented in the appendix. The appendix also establishes the equilibrium of the model.
Unlike in the basic model, wealth and the match are typically not independently
distributed.31 If households are attached to a home region, a positive correlation between
the value of the match, ￿; and household wealth naturally arises. This is illustrated in
Figure 5. In equilibrium, those households, which derive the highest utility premium from
residing in an expensive location, also tend to be wealthy. Typically, these households
have seen the value of their house go up, as their home region has become more popular
and more expensive. This coevolution of housing costs and household wealth is one of the
advantages of owner occupation, discussed by Sinai and Souleles (2005).
While attachment to home, and the resulting positive correlation between wealth an
29In a similar vein, Sinai and Souleles (2005) argue, that onwer occupation is not risky, if a household
intends to stay put for a long time
30Formally, the household expects to draw a high realization of ￿ in the future.
31Correlation arises, since (i) current wealth depends on past location and portfolio choices (and luck),
(ii) past choices were in￿ uenced by past match realizations, and (iii) the current match is correlated with
past match realizations.
35the match, may seem a rather natural case to consider, the model is ￿ exible enough to
allow for many other alternatives as well. For example, if some households constantly
derive a high utility premium from residing in a currently popular and expensive area,
a di⁄erent pattern arises. Those who insist on living in a fashionable location in every
period, have to move against the tide, from an area of fading popularity and falling
prices to an area of high prices. Then in equilibrium, the size of the utility premium and
household wealth tend to be negatively correlated.
Overall, since expected tenure length and future moving plans may a⁄ect households￿
location choices, and since wealth and the match tend to be correlated, the equilibrium
is typically more complex than in the basic model. Nevertheless, the main message of
the paper carries over: The pattern of residential sorting re￿ ects the relative strength of
the consumption motive and the investment motive. In particular, there is a negative
correlation between the size of house price ￿ uctuations and the degree of sorting in the
match dimension. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where panel a corresponds to a situation
with small regional shocks, a strong (in relative terms) investment motive, small house
price ￿ uctuations, and a high degree of sorting in the match dimension. In panel b regional
shocks are larger, and the consumption motive dominates; then price ￿ uctuations are more
pronounced, and sorting takes place mainly in the wealth dimension.
More formally, the appendix proves that the main results of the paper, Propositions
1, 2 and 3, and Corollary 1, still hold, with the exception that ￿ is substituted by ￿. (A
change in ￿ would also alter the stationary match distribution.) If ￿ = 0, so that there
are no idiosyncratic shocks, these results hold verbatim.
5 Empirical evidence
In this section we present some empirical evidence on regional house price ￿ uctuations
and residential sorting. We consider observations from the US metropolitan statistical
areas (MSAs) and local municipalities (so called Minor Civil Divisions or MCDs). The
data are from the 1990 decennial census (see the appendix for details).
We ￿rst examine how house price variations in the MSAs are related to the degree of
36residential sorting of the MCDs within each MSA. By Corollary 1, we expect that MCDs
within MSAs that experience large house price ￿ uctuations have diverse populations in
the sense that the shares of di⁄erent demographic groups of the MCDs by and large
correspond to the population structure of the underlying MSA. On the other hand, MCDs
in areas where prices are less volatile should have a less diverse population, with certain
demographic groups under- or overrepresented, compared with the MSA average.32
We proxy household types by characteristics such as income, education and age (cf.
Rhode and Strumph (2003)). We apply conventional sorting measures: the dissimilarity
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where Smi is the share of age, education or income group m in the population of the
MCD i, Sm is the corresponding share at the MSA level, Ni is the population of MCD i
and N is the population of the MSA. The indices vary between zero and one. We have
D;GC;T = 0 when each type is equally represented in each community (no sorting), and
D;GC;T = 1 when the types are completely sorted across municipalities.33 Basically, the
indices D; GC and T rank the MSAs by the degree of residential sorting.
As a ￿benchmark￿ measure of house price ￿ uctuations, (henceforth ￿house price
volatility￿ ) we use the standard deviation of the monthly house price pit of the MSA
i over the period Jan 1975 to Dec 2000, where pit = log(PIit=PIt), PIit is the house price
index in MSA i in month t, and PIt is the US house price index in month t.34 Basically,
this measure ranks MSAs by the degree at which their house prices have ￿ uctuated against
32Here we adopt an interpretation of the model, where a location corresponds to a MCD, while the
entire economy is the MSA.
33For additional properties of the indices see Reardon and Firebaugh (2002) and Rhode and Strumph
(2003).
34We employ the Freddie Mac House Price Index data (see
http://www.freddiemac.com/￿nance/fmhpi/).
37the US average.
A potential problem in our benchmark measure of house price volatility is that it does
not distinguish MSAs where relative house prices have been volatile, but stationary, from
MSAs where relative house prices have been upward or downward trending. To address
this issue, we consider an alternative measure of house price volatility obtained as the
standard deviation of the detrended house price series pit ￿ pHP
it , where the trend pHP
it is
computed by applying the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter.35
In addition to the above de￿ned measures of house price volatility, we examine house
price ￿ uctuations using turning point analysis. The turning points - peaks and troughs - of
relative house prices pit are identi￿ed with the Bry-Boschan algorithm (Bry and Boschan
(1971), see also Harding and Pagan (2002)).36 The minimum number of turning points in
our sample is 2 (there are 5 such MSAs in the sample) while the maximum number is 13.
Typically, there are 3-8 turning points: the mean is 5.8, the median as well as the mode is
4. Thus (since peaks and troughs alternate), on a whole in our sample period, the relative
house price of a MSA tends to move up and down. (In the whole sample of 275 MSAs,
relative house prices are in a downward phase 57% of the time, and in an upward phase
43% of the time.) Our turning point analysis based measures of house price volatility
are the average and the maximum amplitude of upward and downward phases of house
prices pit in the sample period. These measures attempt to gauge the size of house price
￿ uctuations the MSA has experienced during the sample period.
Table 2 reports sample correlations between the alternative sorting measures of the
three type characteristics and the four measures of house price volatility. Consistent with
our theory, each sorting measure is negatively correlated with each measure of house price
volatility. Thus, independent of the applied measures, MCDs within MSAs subject to high
house price volatility tend to be less sorted than MCDs in MSAs with little house price
variation, and vice versa.
According to our theory, the degree of residential sorting should be associated with
(expected) future regional house price ￿ uctuations, as well as past ￿ uctuations. Thus it
35We use the value ￿ = 14400, for monthly series.
36See Claessens et al. (2009, 2011) for recent applications of turning point analysis to ￿nancial cycles,
including cycles in real house prices.
38is arguably a rather natural choice to use price data from a period following, as well as
preceding, our 1990 cross-section, when measuring the size of house price ￿ uctuations.
However, as a robustness check, we also computed the volatility measures using the sub-
sample 1975-1990, preceding our cross section. Also these measures of the size of house
price ￿ uctuations are negatively correlated with all the sorting measures (D, GC, T) for
income, age and education, see Table 2A in the appendix.
A potential concern is that the observed correlation between residential sorting and
house price volatility might arise from factors beyond the mechanism suggested by our
theory. Therefore, to examine the robustness of the correlations, we run OLS regressions
of di⁄erent sorting measures on house price volatility and selected covariates. Our baseline
regressions are reported in Table 3. In all the regressions, the coe¢ cient estimate of house
price volatility is negative, and the estimate is also statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level
in all the regressions, save one. (The exception is column (3) where the estimate is not
statistically signi￿cant.) Therefore, residential sorting and house price volatility appear
to be (negatively) correlated even if we partial out the applied covariates.
The coe¢ cient estimate of the number of MCDs is positive and statistically signi￿cant
in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3. This is consistent with the idea that a large number
of MCDs o⁄er more opportunities for forming di⁄erent homogeneous income groups than
a small number of MCDs.37 The coe¢ cient estimate of the average population size of
MCDs is negative in all regressions. This is in line with the idea that a large population
in an MCD can encompass a larger range of households than a small population, and thus,
ceteris paribus, tends to reduce sorting across regions. This e⁄ect appears statistically
signi￿cant in regressions regarding sorting by income and education. We expect that
sorting may be more bene￿cial in urbanized areas with high population density than in
rural areas with low population density. We also expect that larger MSAs are likely to
provide more opportunities for bene￿cial sorting than small MSAs (cf. Hoxby (2000)).
37In particular, if the number of MCDs is less than the number of di⁄erent types, it is not possible
to achieve maximal sorting in the sense that each type resides in a separate region (cf. Eberts and
Gronberg (1981)). In our case, the number of income groups (25) exceeds the number of MCDs in many
metropolitan areas. As a robustness check, we recomputed the sorting indices with four income groups
(formed by merging the original groups). In our baseline regression the coe¢ cient of the number MCDs
was no longer statistically signi￿cant. Otherwise, however, the results were qualitatively the same.
39In line with these assertions, the coe¢ cient estimates of the density of the MSA and
the area size of the MSA are positive (with one exception in column (4)) when they are
statistically signi￿cant. Finally, the negative (and weakly signi￿cant) coe¢ cient estimate
of the number of families in MSA in columns (1) and (3) suggests that it is harder to
obtain homogeneous income groups from a large population than from a small population,
ceteris paribus.
Various additional covariates can be justi￿ed in our regressions. Recent literature in-
dicates that physical and regulatory constraints, which hinder housing construction, may
have signi￿cant implications for the house price dynamics and the development of the
MSAs (See Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) and Saiz (2010)). Obviously, such con-
straints might induce correlation between residential sorting and house price volatility. To
account for such e⁄ects, we consider the land topographic unavailability measure (￿Phys-
ical constraints￿ ) of Saiz (2010) and the Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation
Index (￿Regulatory constraints￿ ) of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008). These variables
are available for 225 MSAs in our original sample.38 Arguably, the characteristics of the
built environment may a⁄ect the pattern of residential sorting (see Nechyba (2000) and
the recent paper by Bayer and McMillan (2011)). If, say, the housing stock is very dif-
ferent in di⁄erent parts of a MSA, one expects that the degree of sorting in the MSA
should be relatively high, ceteris paribus. To measure heterogeneity of the housing stock
across municipalities in an MSA, we compute the dissimilarity index for two aspects of
the housing stock, the age of housing units, DHoAge, and the number of housing units in
a residential building39, DHoUnit. The interpretation of these measures is as above: the
larger the value of DHoAge (or DHoUnit), the more the MCDs within the MSA di⁄er from
each other. Finally, given that our theory applies to owner-occupied households, it is
reasonable to include the share of rental housing as a covariate.
Table 4 reports OLS regressions that augment our baseline regressions with all of the
aforementioned additional covariates. Again, in all of the regressions, the coe¢ cient esti-
mate of house price volatility is negative, and the estimate is also statistically signi￿cant
38The data are obtained from http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~saiz/SUPPLYDATA.zip.
39This measure essentially tells whether there are detached houses, semi-detached houses or blocks of
￿ ats in an area.
40at the 1% level in all regressions but one. (The exception is column (3) where the estimate
is not statistically signi￿cant.) The coe¢ cient estimates of the measures of physical and
regulatory constraints as well as those of the dissimilarity measures of housing, DHoAge
and DHoUnit, are positive whenever they are statistically signi￿cant. This is as one would
expect. The diversity of housing units, DHoUnit, seems particularly important, as it is
statistically signi￿cant at least at 1% level in all regressions. The coe¢ cient estimates of
the rental share is statistically signi￿cant in all regressions. The estimates indicate that a
larger rental sector in a MSA is associated with a higher degree of sorting in terms of age
and education, and a lower degree of sorting in terms of income. The latter observation
may re￿ ect the presence of rent control in a number of metropolitan housing markets: un-
der rent control, the allocation of housing is not determined by the willingness to pay, but
by some other mechanisms, such as queueing (cf. Glaeser and Luttmer (2003)). Finally,
the coe¢ cient estimates of the remaining regressors are similar to those of Table 3.
The results of Tables 3 and 4 are not sensitive to the measure of house price volatility.
Table 5 (6) reports regressions with alternative house price volatility measures (one based
on HP ￿ltered relative house prices and two based on turning point analysis) and the
covariates of Table 3 (4). The dependent variables, the sorting measures for income,
education and age in Tables 5 and 6 are based on the dissimilarity index. In the regressions
of Tables 5 and 6, the coe¢ cient estimate of house price volatility is always negative and
in most cases also statistically signi￿cant. Furthermore, the estimation results on the
covariates are largely in line with those of Tables 3 and 4.
As a further robustness check we run the above regressions by using house price volatil-
ity measures computed from the subsample 1975-1990, preceding our cross section. The
regression results are qualitatively similar, see Tables 3A-6A in the Appendix.
We turn to comparing residential sorting of movers to that of stayers across (so called)
Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) in di⁄erent MSAs.40 This part is related to the
work by Ortalo-MagnØ and Rady (2008), who study income distributions among movers
and stayers.
According to Proposition 7, stayers should be less sorted than movers in the type
40Each PUMA has a population of approximately 100 000. For further information, see the appendix.
41dimension. Furthermore, our theory suggests that the low degree of sorting among stayers
is related to capital gains and losses made in the housing market. To investigate the
above predictions, we classify an individual as a mover, if (s)he has resided in his/her
current home for less than ￿ve years; otherwise the individual is a stayer. Then, for each
characteristic (age, education, income) and each group (movers and stayers), we compute
the three sorting indices (D, GC, T) across PUMAs in each MSA.41 The PUMA data
allows us to compute separate indices for owner-occupied households and households that
live in rental housing (the predictions of our model should hold for owner-occupiers.)
The results on owner-occupied movers and stayers are reported in the ￿rst two columns
of Table 7, and in Table 8. Consistent with the prediction of our model, the degree
of sorting is lower among stayers than movers. Moreover, the di⁄erences between the
sorting patterns of (owner-occupied) movers and stayers are more pronounced in those
metropolitan areas that had experienced large house price swings prior to our 1990 cross
section; see Table 8.42 This observation is consistent with Proposition 7, item c43, and it
lends support to the notion that the low degree of sorting among owner-occupied stayers
could be related to capital gains and losses made in the housing market.
As a further piece of evidence on the role of house price ￿ uctuations in moulding the
pattern of sorting among owner-occupied households, we compare owners to renters, who
do not face wealth shocks in the housing markets. We ￿nd that among renters, the pattern
of sorting is quite di⁄erent: stayers are actually more sorted than movers; see columns (3)
and (4) in Table 7, and Table 9. Furthermore, among renters, the di⁄erences between the
sorting patterns of movers and stayers tend to be less pronounced in those metropolitan
areas that have experienced large house price ￿ uctuations.
As an additional piece of evidence, we compare ￿short distance movers,￿i.e. house-
holds which have moved within the same metropolitan area, and ￿long distance movers,￿
41In our data set there are 103 MSAs, each of which contains at least two PUMAs.
42When examining the hypothesis presented in Proposition 7c, it is natural to use price data from a
period preceding the 1990 cross-section. As a measure of the size of house price ￿ uctuations we use here
the maximum amplitude of pt = log(PIt) ￿ log(PIUS
t ) over the period 1975-1990.
43Here we have in mind the following - admittedly somewhat rough - correspondence between the
observations and Proposition 7c: MSAs that had experienced large house price ￿ uctuations (the 4th
quartile) are locations with s = 1, while the remaining MSAs are locations with s = 0.
42i.e. households, which have moved from another metropolitan area.44 Because ￿long dis-
tance movers￿have more likely moved between two uncorrelated markets (so that the
prices of the old and the new home may have evolved very di⁄erently), they should be
more sorted than ￿short distance movers.￿The sorting measures reported in Table 10 in-
dicate that ￿long distance movers￿are indeed more sorted than ￿short distance movers,￿
according to all three type criteria and whether we look at owner-occupiers or renters.
While this ￿nding holds for both owner-occupiers and renters, the di⁄erences between
the sorting patterns of ￿long distance movers￿ and ￿short distance movers￿ are more
signi￿cant among owner-occupiers than among renters.
6 Conclusions
This paper examined how the asset aspect of housing a⁄ects households￿location choices
and the socioeconomic make-up of local jurisdictions. Our theoretical analysis suggests
that a strong investment motive is associated with a high degree of residential sorting
according to household type. Since buying an expensive home in a currently popular
location is a large and risky investment, in equilibrium only households with a high
current utility premium reside in these areas, while other households choose a cheaper
location.
If investment considerations only play a minor role, and the consumption motive
dominates, there will be less sorting in the type dimension and more sorting in the wealth
dimension. Typically, a household resides in an unpopular location if and only if its wealth
is low and it cannot a⁄ord a more expensive home. Since current wealth depends, in part,
on past luck in the housing market, households residing within the same area may then
have little in common, except for the value of their home.
To sum up, there is an inverse relation between the importance of investment consid-
erations at the household level, and the importance of the wealth aspect of housing at
the aggregate level. The less the households see the home as an investment, the more
44We also use data on people that have moved from or to a non-MSA region. See the appendix for
more details.
43the asset aspect of housing moulds the socioeconomic make-up of jurisdictions and the
pattern of sorting.
Empirically, the model predicts that the size of regional house price ￿ uctuations should
be negatively correlated with the degree of residential sorting according to household type.
To examine this hypothesis, we computed measures of residential sorting for income,
age and education. In a sample of US metropolitan areas, we documented a negative
relationship between the degree of sorting and the size of house price ￿ uctuations.
Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
Location choice
The household￿ s decision problem boils down to the choice of the sequence of optimal
thresholds ￿
￿
n. Since xn ￿ G(￿
￿
n) is a monotonous function of ￿
￿
n, also xn can be treated
as a choice variable. Using the threshold rule (8) and integrating (5) over all ￿ shows that
the household￿ s decision problem can be summarized by the Bellman equation45
V (n) = max
xn
u(xn) + ￿ f(1 ￿ ￿)V (n) + ￿ [xnV (n + 1) + (1 ￿ xn)V (n ￿ 1)]g; (37)












is the expected utility stream at wealth level n. Notice that
d2u(xn)
dx2
n = ￿ 1
G0(￿￿
n) < 0.
Thus (37) de￿nes a maximization problem with a concave objective function and linear
constraints. As a consequence the value function V (n) is concave.
We also show that limn!1￿
￿
n = ￿". If not, then limn!1￿
￿





n is a non-increasing sequence, and, by assumption, the feasible values of ￿
￿

















= 0 for all ￿nite, positive
integers k ￿ 1. But then limn!1 (un+k ￿ un) = 0 for all k ￿ 1. As a consequence,
limn!1 [V (n + 1) ￿ V (n ￿ 1)] = 0, and limn!1 ￿
￿
n = ￿". A contradiction.
Next, let v (n) ￿ V (n + 1) ￿ V (n ￿ 1); and ￿xn ￿ xn+1 ￿ xn￿1; since ￿
￿
n is a non-
increasing sequence, ￿xn 2 [￿1;0]. Also let ￿un ￿ u(xn+1)￿u(xn￿1) =
R xn￿1
xn+1 G￿1 (x)dx￿
￿xn". Finally de￿ne the operator L
L[z (n)] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)z (n) + ￿ [xn+1z (n + 1) + (1 ￿ xn￿1)z (n ￿ 1)];
where z (n) is a generic function of n. Since V (n) satis￿es the recursive equation (37),
45Di⁄erentiating (37) with respect to xn shows that the optimal thresholds are characterized by (7).
44v (n) satis￿es the recursive equation
v (n) = ￿un + ￿L[v (n)]: (38)
Finally, the expression for ￿
￿
n, eq. (7), can be rewritten as
￿
￿
n = Q(n;";￿;￿) ￿ ￿" + ￿￿v (n) for n ￿ 1:
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) De￿ne q" (n) ￿
dv(n)
d" . Di⁄erentiating (38) yields q" (n) = ￿￿xn + ￿L[q" (n)]. (No-
tice that indirect e⁄ects can be ignored due to the envelope theorem.) Let q"
max ￿
maxq" (n) and n" ￿ argmaxq" (n). Now q"
max ￿ ￿￿xn" + ￿q"













= ￿1 + ￿￿q




1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
< 0:
(ii) De￿ne q￿ (n) =
d[￿v(n)]
d￿ . Multiplying both sides of (38) by ￿ and di⁄erentiating the
resulting equation by ￿; yields q￿ (n) = ￿un + ￿L[v (n)] ￿ ￿v (n) + ￿L[q￿ (n)]. Using eq
(38), this simpli￿es to q￿ (n) = (1 ￿ ￿)v (n) + ￿L[q￿ (n)]. Let q￿
min ￿ minq (n) and n￿ ￿
argminq (n). Now q￿
min ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v (n￿) + ￿q￿














￿ (n) ￿ ￿q
￿
min > 0:
(iii) De￿ne q￿ (n) =
d[￿v(n)]
d￿ . Multiplying both sides of (38) by ￿ and di⁄erentiating the
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￿ (n) ￿ ￿q
￿
min > 0:
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) In the main text we used the welfare measure w, de￿ned in (20) An alternative way
to approach social welfare is to imagine that a new household enters the economy. The
entrant is assigned to wealth class n with probability f (n), and its expected intertemporal
prospects are then given by the value function V (n) = E￿ [V (￿;n)]. The household￿ s




f (n)V (n): (39)
We ￿rst establish a relationship between the welfare measures w and W; this relationship
is needed when we prove the proposition.
Using vector notation, equation (37) can be rewritten as follows
V = max
fxng
u + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿A]V (40)
for n ￿ 1 (and x0 = 1) where V is the (ex ante) value function, stacked as a column
vector, u is a column vector with elements un = u(xn), and A is a transition matrix,
with elements Ai;j = 1 ￿ xi if j = i ￿ 1, Ai;j = xi if j = i + 1 and Ai;j = 0 otherwise.
Premultiplying both sides of (40) by the stationary wealth distribution f0 yields f0V =
f0u + f0￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿A]V . The distribution f is induced by the transition matrix A,
and it satis￿es the equation f0A = f0. But then we have
w = f
0u = (1 ￿ ￿)f
0V = (1 ￿ ￿)W (41)
Essentially, W is the present value of a program with a (constant) per-period payo⁄ w.
(ii) As proving the proposition with respect to ", ￿ and ￿ involves the same steps, we
introduce a generic parameter ￿, where ￿ 2 f";￿;￿g. Also, let x be the vector with the
































Equality (a) involves a decomposition into the direct e⁄ect and the indirect e⁄ect. (b)
follows from the fact that w does not depend directly on ￿, ￿ and " (see (20)), and thus
@w
@￿ = 0. (c) follows from equality (41). (d) uses the de￿nition of W, (39), and the envelope
theorem: since the threshold ￿
￿
n, and thus also xn, is optimally chosen in all wealth classes
n ￿ 1, a small policy change does not a⁄ect the value function V (n).
By Lemma 1 we know that the wealth distribution shifts to the right, in the sense of
￿rst-order stochastic dominance, when " decreases, and when ￿ or ￿ increases. As the
value function V (n) is increasing in n this shift in the stationary distribution translates
into higher social welfare:
dw
d"






















Proof of Proposition 5
(a) Sorting in the match dimension. When " ! 0, the basic allocation problem van-
ishes, and the result is obvious. Next consider the case ￿ ! 1. The household chooses
46fxng, so as to maximize the value function V , where V satis￿es the recursive equation
V = ￿AV + (1 ￿ ￿) u
1￿￿. (This equation follows directly from (40).) Iterating forward,




1￿￿. Next notice that limt!1 At = 1￿f0 (where ￿ is Kro-
necker product). Thus when ￿ ! 1 and ￿ ! 1, so that ￿ ! 1, maximizing V becomes
essentially equivalent to maximizing f0u = w = 1
2E [￿ j h = 1]. The objective function
w = 1
2E [￿ j h = 1] is maximized i⁄ there is perfect sorting in the match dimension.
(b) Sorting in the wealth dimension. The putative equilibrium strategy is of the
following form: h(0;￿) = 0 for all ￿ (due to the borrowing constraint), h(n;￿) = 1 for all
￿ and n ￿ 1. Then in equilibrium f (0) = f (1) = 1
2 and f (n) = 0 for all n ￿ 2.
Given this strategy, it is easy to calculate the ex ante values of the program V (n)
at di⁄erent wealth levels n ￿ 0. In particular, one can show that V (2) ￿ V (0) =
(1 ￿ ￿)
"+E[￿]
1￿￿ . Given the optimal location choice rule (6), the putative strategy is optimal
for the household i⁄ it always prefers the desirable location at wealth level n = 1, i.e., i⁄
￿ + " > ￿￿ [V (2) ￿ V (0)] = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
" + E [￿]
1 ￿ ￿
for all ￿: (42)
In particular, the condition (42) must hold for the lowest possible realization of the match
￿L. Inserting ￿ = ￿L, and slightly manipulating (42), yields the condition for residential
sorting in the wealth dimension: ￿L + " > ￿￿
E[￿]￿￿L
1￿￿ .
Proof of Proposition 7
(a) Wealth dimension. We need to study wealth distributions conditional on housing
location (h 2 f0;1g), and mobility (m = 1 for the households that have moved during
the current period, and m = 0 for the households that have not moved). In the case
of stayers (m = 0), we also need to condition on the realization of the regional shock
(s 2 f0;1g). The main objective is to establish a ￿rst-order stochastic dominance relation
between movers and stayers in each location.
Let f (n j h;m;s) denote the frequency mass of households with wealth n conditional
on h; m and s. The conditional cumulative distribution function of wealth is
F (n j h;m;s) =
Pn
i=0 f (i j h;m;s)
P1
j=0 f (j j h;m;s)
Now, from the discussion and analysis conducted at the beginning of Section 3.2 it follows
that
f (n j h;m = 1;s) =
1
2
e ￿(n;s)f(n); h 2 f0;1g; n ￿ 1 (43)
where e ￿(n;s) is mobility at wealth level n. (In the small region interpretation of the
model, e ￿(n;s) is replaced by b ￿(n).) Essentially, equation (43) tells that the wealth distrib-
ution of movers is identical in both locations. Notice that since e ￿(n;s) = (s + ￿(1 ￿ s))￿(n);
F (n j h;m = 1) = ￿(n)f(n)=
P1
j=0 ￿(j)f(j) does not depend on the realization of s.
Hence
F (n j h = 0;m = 1) = F (n j h = 1;m = 1); n = 0;1;::: (44)
47where we have dropped s from the conditioning set.
Next, let f (n j h) denote the frequency mass of households with wealth n conditional
on the location h (evidently f (n j h) = fh
n￿h (n), using the notation of Section 2.5). We
denote the corresponding cumulative wealth distribution function by F (n j h). Using
equations (9), (10) and (14) we get
f(njh=0)






f(n￿1jh=1) = b ￿ (n ￿ 1) for
n = 0;1;2;:::, while using equations (15), (16), (23) and (43) we get
f(njh2f0;1g;m=1)
f(n￿1jh2f0;1g;m=1) =












it is clear that b ￿ (n) ￿
e ￿ (n) ￿ b ￿ (n ￿ 1) and we can conclude that
F (n j h = 1) ￿ F (n j h 2 f0;1g;m = 1) ￿ F (n j h = 0) (45)
That is, movers (in either location) are wealthier than (all) households living in cheap
locations, but less wealthy than (all) households residing in expensive locations. Next,
F (n j h) is a convex combination of the wealth distributions of movers and stayers living
in location h
F (n j h) = ￿(s)F (n j h;m = 1) + (1 ￿ ￿(s))F (n j h;m = 0;s); h 2 f0;1g; (46)
where ￿(s) =
P1
n=0 e ￿(n;s) is the aggregate share of movers in the economy. Then it
follows from (45) and (46) that
F (n j h = 1;m = 0;s) ￿ F (n j h 2 f0;1g;m = 1) ￿ F (n j h = 0;m = 0;s) (47)
That is, stayers living in the expensive location form the wealthiest group while stayers
living in the cheap location is the least wealthy group. Movers are then in between.
Finally notice that the wealth distribution of stayers depends on the realization of the
regional shock s. Since ￿(s = 1) > ￿(s = 0), it follows from (45), (46) and (47) that
F (n j h = 1;m = 0;s = 1) < F (n j h = 1;m = 0;s = 0)
F (n j h = 0;m = 0;s = 1) > F (n j h = 0;m = 0;s = 0) (48)
In periods of a regional shock (s = 1) there is lots of mobility in the intermediate wealth
groups; thus the borrowing constrained in the cheap location (who have been locked
in by falling house prices) and the very wealthy in the expensive location make up a
larger proportion of stayers than otherwise (when s = 0). (By contrast the distributions
F (n j h) - see equation (14) - and F (n j h;m = 1) do not depend on the realization of
the shock.)
Match dimension. To prove the proposition we need to construct, and compare,
cumulative match distribution functions G(￿ j h;m;s), contingent on housing location
h 2 f0;1g and mobility m 2 f0;1g (and the regional shock s 2 f0;1g).
As a ￿rst step, we characterize the match distributions of households living in the
desirable and in the undesirable location, conditional on wealth class n. Given the thresh-
old location choice rule (8), the distribution in the desirable location G(￿ j h = 1;n) =






n) for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
n (and 0 for ￿ < ￿
￿
n) is left-truncated, while the dis-





n) for ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
n
(and 1 for ￿ > ￿
￿
n) is right-truncated. Now, two properties follow from the threshold rule:
(i) G(￿ j h = 1;n = n1) ￿ G(￿ j h = 0;n = n2) for all ￿, and for all n1; n2. That is, the
match distribution of households living in a desirable location stochastically dominates
the match distribution of households living in an undesirable location; the ￿typical￿match
at any wealth level n1 in location h = 1 is higher than the ￿typical￿match at any wealth








n ￿ 0 for
all ￿. Now, since the threshold ￿
￿
n is decreasing in n (wealthier households are more likely
to choose a desirable location), we get the ￿rst-order stochastic dominance relation
G(￿ j h;n
0
1) ￿ G(￿ j h;n
0




2 and h 2 f0;1g. (49)
That is, the lower the wealth level n, the higher is the ￿typical￿match in either location
(desirable or undesirable).
As a second step, notice that the conditional match distributions G(￿ j h;m;s) are
convex combinations of location-contingent distributions G(￿ j h;n) at di⁄erent wealth
levels n
G(￿ j h;m;s) =
X
n
b f (n j h;m;s)G(￿ j h;n); for h;m;s 2 f0;1g (50)
where b f (n j h;m;s) = f (n j h;m;s)=
P1
i=0 f (i j h;m;s) is the relative size of wealth
class n in the group (m;h) (given the realizations of the shock). Now it follows from
(50) and property (i) (see step 1 above) that
G(￿ j h = 1;m;s) ￿ G(￿ j h = 0;m
0;s); m;m
0 2 f0;1g; s 2 f0;1g: (51)
That is, households (both movers and stayers) living in an expensive location have higher
match realizations, in the sense of ￿rst order stochastic dominance, than households (both
movers and stayers) living in a cheap location. Next, combining equation (50) the sto-
chastic dominance relationship (47) and the (stochastic dominance) property (ii) (see step
1 above) gives
G(￿ j h = 0;m = 0;s) ￿ G(￿ j h = 0;m = 1)
G(￿ j h = 1;m = 0;s) ￿ G(￿ j h = 1;m = 1) for all ￿ (52)
The expressions (52) mean that in a currently cheap location, the match distribution of
old residents stochastically dominates the match distribution of newcomers, while in the
currently expensive location the opposite is true. Thus we have proved that in both areas
movers (with m = 1) tend to have a better match with the location than stayers (m = 0).
As a third step, we combine (51) and (52), and establish a stochastic dominance
relation that covers all four groups:
G(￿ j h = 1;m = 1) ￿ G(￿ j h = 1;m = 0;s) ￿ G(￿ j h = 0;m = 0;s)
￿ G(￿ j h = 0;m = 1) for all ￿; s 2 f0;1g (53)
49As a ￿nal step, notice that the match distributions of stayers depend on the realization
of the regional shock. From (48), (49) and (50) we get
G(￿ j h = 0;m = 0;s = 1) ￿ G(￿ j h = 0;m = 0;s = 0)
G(￿ j h = 1;m = 0;s = 1) ￿ G(￿ j h = 1;m = 0;s = 0) for all ￿ (54)
In a period of a regional shock (s = 1), households that have been locked in by falling
property values form a large portion of stayers in (currently) cheap locations; among this
group there are many who have a high realization of the match ￿. A similar logic holds
for the expensive regions: when house prices rise in the region, many households become
wealthy, due to the capital gains, and decide to stay put although they have a rather
modest match ￿. (By contrast, the match distributions of movers - in either location - do
not depend on the realization of the shock.)
(b) Wealth dimension. It follows from (47) that interregional wealth di⁄erences are
larger among stayers than among movers. Thus stayers are more sorted than movers in
the wealth dimension. Match dimension. It follows from (53) that interregional match
di⁄erences are larger among movers than among stayers. Thus movers are more sorted
than stayers in the match dimension.
(c) Wealth dimension. It follows from (47) and (48) that the degree of sorting among
stayers is greater when there is a regional shock (s = 1), while the degree of sorting among
movers is not a⁄ected by the shock. Since stayers are anyway more sorted than movers,
the di⁄erence between the sorting patterns of movers and stayers is more pronounced,
when house prices change. Match dimension. It follows from (54) and (53) that the
degree of sorting among stayers is smaller when there is a regional shock (s = 1), while
the degree of sorting among movers is not a⁄ected by the shock. Since stayers are anyway
less sorted than movers, the di⁄erence between the sorting patterns of movers and stayers
is more pronounced, when house prices change.
Asymmetric locations
Using the threshold rule (8) and integrating (25) over all ￿ shows that the household￿ s
decision problem can be summarized by the Bellman equation
V (n) = maxxn u(xn) + ￿ fV (n)+
￿ (￿xn [V (n + 1) ￿ V (n)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xn)[V (n ￿ 1) ￿ V (n)])g (55)
subject to x0 = 1, where





Next, let e v (n) ￿ V (n) ￿ V (n), and e ￿xn ￿ xn ￿ xn￿1; since ￿
￿
n is a non-increasing
sequence, e ￿xn 2 [￿1;0]. Also let e ￿un ￿ u(xn) ￿ u(xn￿1) =
R xn￿1
xn G￿1 (x)dx ￿ e ￿xn".
50Next, de￿ne the operator e L
e L[z (n)] = (1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xn) ￿ ￿￿xn￿1)z (n)
+￿ [￿xnz (n + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xn￿1)z (n ￿ 1)]
Since V (n) satis￿es the recursive equation (55), e v (n) satis￿es the recursive equation
e v (n) = e ￿un + ￿b L[b v (n)] (56)
Finally, the critical match ￿
￿
n is given by
￿
￿
n = e Q(n;";￿;￿) ￿ ￿" + ￿￿ [￿e v (n + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿)e v (n)] for n ￿ 1:
Proposition 1￿For all n ￿ 1; (i)
@ e Q(n;";￿;￿)
@" < 0, (ii)
@ e Q(n;";￿;￿)
@￿ > 0 and (iii)
@ e Q(n;";￿;￿)
@￿ > 0.
Proof (i) De￿ne e q" (n) ￿
de v(n)
d" . Di⁄erentiating (56) yields e q" (n) = ￿e ￿xn + ￿e L[e q" (n)].
Let e q"
max ￿ max e q" (n) and e n" ￿ argmax e q" (n). Now e q"
max ￿ ￿e ￿xn" +￿e q"
max
￿















= ￿1 + ￿￿ [￿e q
" (n + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿) e q
" (n)]




1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
< 0:
(ii) De￿ne e q￿ (n) =
d[￿b v(n)]
d￿ : Multiplying both sides of (56) by ￿ and di⁄erentiating
the resulting equation by ￿ yields e q￿ (n) = e ￿un + ￿e L[e v (n)] ￿ ￿e v (n) + ￿e L[e q￿ (n)]. Using
eq. (56), this simpli￿es to e q￿ (n) = (1 ￿ ￿)e v (n) + ￿e L[e q￿ (n)]. Let e q￿
min ￿ min e q￿ (n)
and e n￿ ￿ argmin e q (n). Now e q￿
min ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)e v (e n￿) + ￿e q￿
min
￿
1 + ￿e ￿xe n￿
￿
, and e q￿
min ￿
(1￿￿)e v(e n￿)
1￿￿(1+￿e ￿xe n￿) ￿
(1￿￿)e v(e n￿)








= ￿ [￿e q
￿ (n + 1) + (1 ￿ ￿) e q
￿ (n)] ￿ ￿q
￿
min > 0:
(iii) De￿ne e q￿ (n) =
d[￿e v(n)]
d￿ . Multiplying both sides of (56) by ￿ and di⁄erentiating the




. Using eq (56), this




. Let e q
￿
min ￿ min e q (n) and e n￿ ￿ argmin e q￿ (n).
Now e q
￿







1 + ￿e ￿xe n￿
￿




1￿￿(1+￿e ￿xe n￿) ￿
e v(e n￿)

















51Lemma 1￿Let F (n;";￿;￿) =
Pn
i=0 f (i). For all n = 0;1;:::, we have dF (n;";￿;￿)=d" ￿
0, dF (n;";￿;￿)=d￿ ￿ 0 and dF (n;";￿;￿)=d￿ ￿ 0.
Proof The result follows from Proposition 1￿and equation (30). See the proof of Lemma
1.
Proposition 2￿Let w =
P1
n=0 f (n)u(xn). Then dw
d" < 0, dw
d￿ > 0, dw
d￿ > 0.
Proof The proof consists of the same steps, (i) and (ii), as the proof of Proposition 2.
Step (i): Using vector notation, the Bellman equation (55) can be rewritten as
V = max
x u + ￿ e AV (57)
where e A is a transition matrix, with elements e Ai;i = 1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xi) ￿ ￿￿xi, e Ai;j =
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ xi) if j = i￿1, e Ai;j = ￿￿xi if j = i+1 and Ai;j = 0 otherwise. Premultiply-
ing both sides of (57) by the stationary wealth distribution f0 yields f0V = f0u+f0￿ e AV .
The distribution f is induced by the transition matrix e A, and it satis￿es the equation
f0 e A = f0. But then we have
w = f
0u = (1 ￿ ￿)f
0V = (1 ￿ ￿)W (58)
Essentially, W = f0V is the present value of a program with a (constant) per-period payo⁄
w. Step (ii). See step (ii) in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3￿ When (i) the size of regional shocks (") decreases, (ii) the regional
shocks become more frequent (￿ increases), or (iii) the households become more patient
(￿ increases) the degree of residential sorting in the match dimension increases in the
sense stated in Proposition 2.
Proof When conditions (i),(ii) and/or (iii) hold, it follows from Proposition 2￿ that
E [￿ j h = 1] increases.
(a) Then, since ￿E [￿ j h = 1] + (1 ￿ ￿)E [￿ j h = 0] = E [￿], and E [￿] is a constant,
it follows that E [￿ j h = 0] decreases. Thus the di⁄erence jE [￿ j h] ￿ E [￿]j increases for
h 2 f0;1g.
(b) Item (a) implies that the between-locations variance V ar(E [￿ j h]) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(E [￿ j h = 0] ￿ E [￿])
2 + ￿(E [￿ j h = 1] ￿ E [￿])
2 increases.
(c) The economywide variance of the match V ar(￿) can be decomposed V ar(￿) =
V ar(E [￿ j h])+E [V ar(￿ j h)]. Since V ar(￿) is a constant, it follows from item (b) that
the within-locations component E [V ar(￿ j h)] must decrease.
Proposition 4￿When (i) the size of regional shocks (") increases, (ii) the regional shocks
become less frequent (￿ increases), or (iii) the households become less patient (￿ increases)
the degree of residential sorting in the wealth dimension increases in the sense stated in
Proposition 3.
Proof Notice that equations (30) imply that the distribution of ￿nancial assets is identical
in both location types. Then the result follows from Lemma 1￿ . See Proof of Proposition
4.
Remark 1￿Assume that regional shocks become smaller (" decreases) or more frequent
52(￿ increases), or that households become more patient (￿ increases). Then the size of
house price ￿ uctuations decreases in the sense stated in Remark 1.
Proof The result follows from equation (31) and Lemma 1￿ .
Corollary 1￿The size of house price ￿ uctuations and the pattern of residential sorting
are related in the sense stated in Corollary 1.
Proof The result follows from Propositions 3￿and 4￿and Remark 1￿ .
More general match dynamics
Let v (￿;n) ￿ V (￿;n + 1) ￿ V (￿;n ￿ 1) and ￿h(￿;n) ￿ h(￿;n + 1) ￿ h(￿;n ￿ 1). Also
de￿ne the operator b L












e ￿;n ￿ 1
￿
+ (1 ￿ h(￿;n + 1))z
￿
e ￿;n + 1
￿
j ￿;s = 1
i
;
where z (￿;n) is a generic function of ￿ and n. Since V (￿;n) satis￿es the Bellman equation
(32), the function v (￿;n) satis￿es the recursive equation
v (￿;n) = ￿h(￿;n)(" + ￿) + ￿b L[v (￿;n)]: (59)
For all ￿ and all n ￿ 1, the household￿ s location choice rule assumes the form h(￿;n) = 1 i⁄






j ￿;s = 1
i
.
Proposition 1￿ For all ￿ and n ￿ 1, (i)
d b Q(￿;n;";￿;￿)
d" < 0 , (ii)
d b Q(￿;n;";￿;￿)




Proof (i) De￿ne b q" (￿;n) ￿
dv(￿;n)
d" . Di⁄erentiating (59) with respect to " shows that
b q" (￿;n) satis￿es the equation b q" (￿;n) = ￿h(￿;n) + ￿b L[b q" (￿;n)]. Next de￿ne b q"
max ￿



























































j ￿;s = 1
i




1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
< 0:
53(ii) De￿ne b q￿ (￿;n) ￿
d[￿v(￿;n)]
d￿ . Multiplying both sides of (59) by ￿ and di⁄erenti-
ating with respect to ￿ yields b q￿ (￿;n) = ￿h(￿;n)(" + ￿) + ￿b L[v (￿;n)] ￿ ￿v (￿;n) +
￿b L[b q￿ (￿;n)]: Using (59), this simpli￿es to b q￿ (￿;n) = (1 ￿ ￿)v (￿;n) + ￿b L[b q￿ (￿;n)].
Next de￿ne b q￿






￿ argmin b q￿ (￿;n). Then
b q
￿




























































(iii) De￿ne b q￿ (￿;n) ￿
d[￿v(￿;n)]
d￿ . Multiplying both sides of (59) by ￿; and di⁄erentiating









. Next de￿ne b q
￿






































































Stationary distribution. Let b fn (￿j) denote the long-run frequency mass of house-
holds with match ￿j and wealth n, and let b fn be a J ￿ 1 vector, with the jth element
b fn (￿j). Also let Hn; n ￿ 1, be a J ￿ J diagonal matrix, with the jth diagonal element
h(￿j;n) (and all o⁄-diagonal elements equal to 0), and let Bn = I ￿ Hn. The stationary
distribution satis￿es the following set of recursive equations
b f
0
n = (1 ￿ ￿) b f
0











for all n = 0;1::: Simplifying yields
b f
0











54Notice in particular that the parameters " and ￿ do not appear in (60), and thus the
joint distribution of wealth and the match depends on these parameters only indirectly,
through changes in policies.
Equilibrium. Postmultiplying both sides of equation (60) by the unit vector 1, and
taking into account the fact that ￿01 =￿11 = 1, yields a set of recursive equations for
the marginal distribution of wealth
f (n) = f
0
n￿1 (n ￿ 1) + f
1
n (n + 1) (61)
where f (n) = b f0
n1 is the frequency mass of households at wealth level n, f0
n (n) = b f0
nBn1 is
the mass of households at wealth level n residing in an unpopular location, and f1
n￿1 (n) =
b f0
nHn1 is the mass of households at wealth level n residing in a popular location. But
equation (61) is identical to equation (13) so that equilibrium follows in the same way as
in Section 2.5.
Lemma 1￿ De￿ne the cumulative distribution function b F (￿j;n;";￿;￿) =
Pn
i=0 b fi (￿j).
Then
d b F(￿j;n;";￿;￿)
d" ￿ 0 ,
d b F(￿j;n;";￿;￿)
d￿ ￿ 0 and
d b F(￿j;n;";￿;￿)
d￿ ￿ 0for all n and ￿j.
Proof De￿ne a history as a collection of match realizations and regional shock realizations
Ht = f(￿￿;s￿)gt
￿=0. Notice that histories are exogenous in the sense that they do not
depend on the households￿location choices. Denote a state by y = (￿;n). Consider two
location choice rules h0 and h1 such that for some state b y, h0(b y) = 0 and h1(b y) = 1, and
for all other states y 6= b y; h0(y) = h1(y) = h(y) (where h(y) is the common policy).
Next notice that there is a mapping from histories Ht to states yt, conditional on
policy hi; i 2 f0;1g (and initial state). That is, at any date t, the household￿ s wealth
ni
t = ni (Ht) and the state yi
t = yi (Ht), where i 2 f0;1g refers to the policy that the
household follows.
Consider two households. Household 0 follows policy h0, while household 1 follows
policy h1. Assume the households have the same history Ht. De￿ne ￿t ￿ n0
t ￿ n1
t and










t)) 2 f￿2;0;2g: (62)
Assume that for some period t, ￿t = 0 so that also y0
t = y1
t. Given the properties of h0
and h1 it is evident that
￿￿t 2 f0;2g; if ￿t = 0: (63)
(￿￿t = 2 i⁄ y0
t = y1
t = b y and st+1 = 1). Next, assume the households have the same
initial wealth, ￿0 = 0. From (62) and (63) it follows that ￿t = 2k, k 2 f0;1;2;:::g for
all t = 0;1;2;:::. The essential ￿nding is that, given identical histories and equal initial
wealth, household 1 cannot be wealthier than household 0.
Assume that there is a population of households following policy h0, and another
population following policy h1. Also assume that all households, in either population, have
the same initial wealth. As above, we refer to a household belonging to population 0 (1)
as household 0 (1). Now, the proof of the lemma derives from the following observations.
(i) After any given (common) history Ht, household 0 is at least as wealthy as household
1. (ii) After any given (common) history Ht, household 0 and household 1 have the same
55match. (iii) The probability distribution over the histories does not depend on policy. (iv)
In any period t, and for any given current match, the wealth distribution under policy h0
stochastically dominates the wealth distribution under policy h1. (v) When t ! 1, the
joint distribution of wealth and the match converges to the stationary distribution. Thus
stochastic dominance applies to the stationary distribution. Finally, Proposition 1￿and
Lemma 1￿imply that when " increases, or when ￿ or ￿ decreases, the households may
shift from policy h0 to policy h1, but the opposite shift (from policy h1 to policy h0) never
happens.
Proposition 2￿Social welfare grows, when " decreases, or when ￿ or ￿ increases,
Proof Let us de￿ne a KJ state Markov chain y; where the (nJ + j)th state is given by
the pair (￿j;n). Notice that K (the number of wealth levels) is n + 1, if ￿L > ￿"; and
otherwise K = 1. Let h be a KJ ￿ 1 vector, with the (nJ + j)th element h(￿j;n).
Further de￿ne a KJ ￿ KJ diagonal matrix H, with the vector h on the diagonal (and
all o⁄-diagonal elements equal to zero), and let the KJ ￿KJ matrix b A be the transition
matrix of the Markov chain y.
The value function can be presented as a KJ ￿ 1 vector b V , where the (nJ + j)th
element is the value of the household￿ s program in state (￿j;n). b V satis￿es the Bellman
equation









(1 ￿ ￿)I + ￿ b A
i
b V ; (64)
where ￿ is the J ￿1 vector of types ￿j. The stationary distribution of y is a KJ ￿1 vector
b f. The distribution is induced by the transition matrix b A and it satis￿es the equation






b fn (￿j)h(￿j;n)￿j = b f
0H (1K ￿ ￿) =
1
2






b fn (￿j)V (￿j;n) = b f
0b V
Next we premultiply both sides of (64) by b f0. Then using the fact that b f0 = b f0 b A, and




= 0, by the housing market equilibrium, yields
c W = b w + ￿c W , c W = b w=(1 ￿ ￿): (65)
Given the equation (65), and Lemma 1￿ , Proposition 3￿can be proved following the same
steps as in the proof of Proposition 3. See part (ii) of the proof.
Proposition 3￿When " increases, or ￿ or ￿ decreases, the degree of residential sorting
in the match dimension decreases in the sense explained in Proposition 2.
Proof The result follows from Proposition 2￿ . See the proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4￿When " increases, or ￿ or ￿ decreases, the degree of residential sorting
in the wealth dimension increases in the sense explained in Proposition 4.
Proof The results follows from Lemma 1￿ . See the proof of Proposition 4.
56Remark 1￿Assume that regional shocks become smaller (" decreases) or more frequent
(￿ increases), or that households become more patient (￿ increases). Then the size of
house price ￿ uctuations decreases in the sense stated in Remark 1.
Proof The result follows from equation (19) and Lemma 1￿ .
Corollary 1￿The size of house price ￿ uctuations and the pattern of residential sorting
are related in the sense stated in Corollary 1.
Proof The result follows from Propositions 3￿and 4￿and Remark 1￿ .
Appendix B: Data description
Description of variables of Tables 2-6
The ￿house price volatility￿is described in the main text.
Except the house price volatility measures, the variables in Tables 2, 3 and 5 are
computed from extraction of data from the 1990 decennial Census, published in the ICPSR
study 2889 (1990). We apply the data set 2 (DS2) where each variable is aggregated to the
municipality (MCD) level. Because MCDs are geographically comprehensive, our MSA
level observations are formed by summing up all relevant MCD level data. We apply the
MSA classi￿cation de￿ned by the variable ￿v7￿in the DS2 data set (see ICPSR study 2889
(1990)). For each of the MSAs, we ￿nd a corresponding MSA in the MSA classi￿cation
of the house price data.
The sorting measures for age, education and income are based on the following groups
of types. Five groups for age: (1) ￿children￿(those of 0-15 years old), (2) ￿youth￿(16-24
years old), (3) ￿adults, early career￿(25-44 years old), (4) ￿adults, late career￿(45-64
years old), and (5) ￿seniors￿(those at least 65 years old). Three groups for education:
(1) less than a high school degree, (2) at least a high school degree but not a college
degree, and (3) a college degree or more. The Census de￿nes the education groups for
only those who are at least 25 years old. This age category is used to normalize the
education groups within each region. Finally, for income we apply all the 25 income
groups available in the ICPSR study 2889. In each of the cases, the US level groups
are obtained by a population weighted average of the MSA level groups. The education
and income categories applied here are similar to those of the dissimilarity indices and
Gini coe¢ cients considered by Rhode and Strumpf (2003, p. 1660) (see also their Data
Appendix at www.unc.edu/~cigar/ or www.unc.edu/~prhode/).
With reference to the original variable symbols in the DS2 data set (see ICPSR study
2889 (1990)) we use: ￿v9￿for ￿Number of municipalities￿ ; ￿v103￿and ￿v9￿for ￿Aver-
age population of municipalities￿ ; ￿v103￿and ￿v121￿for ￿Population density in MSA￿ ;
￿v103￿and ￿v121￿for ￿Land area of MSA￿ ; ￿v103￿for ￿Number of families in MSA.￿ ;
￿v1804￿and ￿v1801￿for ￿Rent share￿(i.e., the share of people that live in rental hous-
ing). Finally, the dissimilarity index for the age of housing units (￿DHoAge￿ ) assumes
three groups: houses build (1) ￿at most 5 years ago,￿(2) ￿6-10 years ago,￿and (3) ￿at
least 11 years ago.￿ The corresponding measure for the number of housing units in a
residential building (￿DHoUnit￿ ) assumes three groups: (1) ￿1-unit structures,￿(2) ￿2-4
57unit structures￿and (3) ￿5 or more unit structures.￿
The additional regressors in Tables 4 and 6, ￿Physical constraints￿(the land topo-
graphic unavailability measure of Saiz (2010)) and ￿Regulatory constraints￿(the Wharton
Residential Urban Land Regulation Index of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008)), are
obtained from http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/~saiz/SUPPLYDATA.zip.
The samples of the regressions in Tables 2-6 constitute all those MSAs for which the
applied variables are available.
Description of sorting measures of Tables 7-10
The data applied in Tables 7-10 are from the Census data provided at www.ipums.org.
The web site provides detailed de￿nitions for each variable in the data. For each obser-
vation unit (i.e., person) in the 1% sample from the 1990 Census, we downloaded house-
hold id (SERIAL), age (AGE), educational attainment (EDUC99), household income
(FTOTINC), tenure (OWNERSHP), migration information (MIGRATE5, MIGMET5,
MIGPLAC5) and location indicators (PUMA, STATEFIP, METAREA). These data in-
clude observations on 2;479;568 persons from 1760 di⁄erent PUMAs. The actual number
of people in each PUMA is also obtained from www.ipums.org.
To compute the sorting measures applied in Tables 7-9, we classify each sample person
into a mover (MIGRATE5 = 2) or a stayer (MIGRATE5 = 1). Furthermore, we classify a
person as an owner, if OWNERSHP = 10 and a renter, if OWNERSHP = 20. Persons with
missing observations on MIGRATE5 or OWNERSHP are excluded from the calculations.
The sorting measures for age, education and income apply similar categories as in Tables
2-6. For age, we estimate the shares of ￿children,￿￿youth,￿etc. in each PUMA (and
MSA) by computing the relative shares of the sample persons belonging to the relevant
age category (for ￿children￿the share of those 0-15 years old, etc.). For education, we
restrict the sample to those at least 25 years old. The three education groups (consistent
with those in Tables 2-6) are formed by (1) EDUC99 ￿ 9, (2) 10 ￿ EDUC99 ￿ 11, and
(3) 12 ￿ EDUC99. Finally, to compute the index for income, we ￿rst restrict the sample
to household heads only (SERIAL = 1). Then we employ FTOTINC to classify each
household into one of the 25 income ranges used in the ICPSR data, and compute the
corresponding relative shares in each PUMA (and MSA).
To compute the sorting measures applied in Table 10, we ￿rst restrict the sample into
persons that have moved recently (MIGRATE5 = 2). Within this subsample, we classify
a person as a ￿short distance mover,￿if his current MSA is the same as ￿ve years ago,
i.e., if METAREA and MIGMET5 match; otherwise the person is classi￿ed as a ￿long
distance mover.￿In addition to data on persons that have moved from one MSA region
to another, we also use data on persons that have moved from or to a non-MSA region.
If a person has moved from an MSA region to a non-MSA region, or vice versa, he or
she is recorded as a ￿long distance mover,￿while a person that has moved between two
non-MSA regions is recorded as a ￿long distance mover￿only, if his or her current state
of residence (STATEFIP) is di⁄erent from that ￿ve years ago (MIGPLAC5). Otherwise,
the sorting measures with respect to income, education and age are formed by applying
the same procedures as in Tables 7-9.
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New York 5:3 12:0
Los Angeles 6:7 11:1
San Francisco 6:4 11:4
Source: Malpezzi, 1999
64Table 2. Correlation between sorting measures and house
price volatility
Measure of house price volatility
benchmark filter a:ampl: m:ampl:
D ￿:257 ￿:154 ￿:136 ￿:210
Income GC ￿:253 ￿:158 ￿:131 ￿:209
T ￿:189 ￿:158 ￿:129 ￿:181
D ￿:282 ￿:291 ￿:206 ￿:250
Education GC ￿:293 ￿:296 ￿:202 ￿:254
T ￿:281 ￿:295 ￿:226 ￿:270
D ￿:243 ￿:080 ￿:141 ￿:166
Age GC ￿:268 ￿:130 ￿:143 ￿:186
T ￿:186 ￿:053 ￿:139 ￿:144
Notes: Correlations are reported between measures of resi-
dential sorting and house price volatility. For each of the
types (income, education, and age), the applied sorting mea-
sures are the dissimilarity index D in (34), the Gini coe¢ -
cient GC in (35), and the Theil￿ s information theory index
T in (36). See Appendix B for de￿nitions of the applied in-
come, educational and age categories. The applied measures
of house price volatility are computed from monthly house
price indices Jan 1975 through Dec 2000. ￿Benchmark￿is
the standard deviation (SD) of the MSA house price relative
to the US house price; ￿filter￿is the SD of (HP-￿lter) de-
trended relative house price, while ￿a:ampl:￿(￿m:ampl:￿ ) is
the average (maximum) di⁄erence between two consecutive



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































69Table 2A. Correlation between sorting measures and house
price volatility
Measure of house price volatility
benchmark filter a:ampl: m:ampl:
D ￿:164 ￿:145 ￿:186 ￿:189
Income GC ￿:151 ￿:147 ￿:184 ￿:189
T ￿:097 ￿:153 ￿:185 ￿:157
D ￿:255 ￿:281 ￿:257 ￿:237
Education GC ￿:255 ￿:284 ￿:254 ￿:243
T ￿:255 ￿:285 ￿:268 ￿:252
D ￿:203 ￿:075 ￿:087 ￿:156
Age GC ￿:223 ￿:123 ￿:110 ￿:177
T ￿:164 ￿:051 ￿:071 ￿:128
Notes: Notes to table 2 apply except that he applied measures
of house price volatility are computed from monthly house














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































74Table 7. Sorting among movers and stayers
Owners Renters
Movers Stayers Movers Stayers
D :190 :137 :163 :243
Income GC :218 :159 :189 :278
T :045 :021 :035 :085
D :137 :112 :133 :145
Education GC :161 :132 :154 :167
T :029 :021 :028 :032
D :077 :071 :080 :117
Age GC :089 :083 :093 :138
T :010 :008 :010 :022
Notes: The entries of the table report the means across
103 MSAs of sorting measures of movers and stay-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































UK average = 1


















US average = 1
Figure 2: Relative house prices in the US (Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency)
79*









Figure 3: The 
∗
-curve when  is uniformly distributed on [−1
2 1










































h = 0 h = 1
Figure 4: Equilibrium pattern of residential sorting with diﬀerent values of the regional
shock, , when the match, , is uniformly distributed on [−1
2 1
2],  = 95,a n d = 2.
In each panel, the cumulative wealth (match) distribution is measured on the horizontal




81Figure 5: Equilibrium distribution of wealth, match and location, with two values of the
regional shock, , when the match, , is governed by a four-state Markov process. The
match realizations are 1 = −1
2 2 = −1
6 3 = 1
6 4 = 1
2 and the associated transition










⎦ (when the match changes for household speciﬁc










⎦ (when the match changes due to a regional shock).
In steady state the mass of each realization is 1
4. The remaining parameters of the model
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